T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:521- Finding
Mutable Remote Foundry Installer Is Piped Directly into a Shell
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Locations:
SKILL.md:521-524references/testing-guide.md:9-12references/toolchain-guide.md:49-52
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: CriticalVulnerable Code:
SKILL.md:521-524bash # Installation curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash foundryupreferences/testing-guide.md:9-12bash # Install Foundry curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash foundryupreferences/toolchain-guide.md:49-52bash # Installation curl -L https://foundry.paradigm.xyz | bash foundryupTechnical Analysis
Each instruction retrieves mutable content from an external URL and sends the response directly to
bash. The user cannot inspect the retrieved installer before execution, and the command provides no version pinning, checksum validation, signature verification, or content allowlisting.The
-Loption follows redirects, which means the final executable response may originate from a different endpoint. HTTPS protects the connection to the responding server but does not protect against compromise of the domain, hosting account, redirect destination, CDN, or release process. It also does not ensure that the installer remains identical to the version reviewed during this audit.Installing Foundry is relevant to the Skill's testing functionality. However, executing mutable remote content directly in a shell is not the minimum privilege or minimum-risk method necessary to install it.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the installer domain, hosting infrastructure, redirect destination, or content delivery process.
- The attacker replaces the legitimate response with a malicious shell script.
- A user follows one of the documented installation procedures.
curldownloads the attacker-controlled response and follows any configured redirects.bashimmediately executes the r ...[truncated 771 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Remove all instances of
curl ... | bash. - Pin installation instructions to a specific reviewed Foundry release.
- Download the release artifact separately from the project's documented release repository.
- Verify a publisher-provided cryptographic signature or checksum before extraction or execution.
- Display and inspect installer content before running it when a packaged release is unavailable.
- Perform installation under a non-administrative account and avoid
sudo. - Document the expected downloaded filename, checksum, destination paths, and permissions.
- Prefer a reproducible container image or other isolated tool environment.
- Keep all three installation examples synchronized so an unsafe command is not retained in a secondary guide.
A safer conceptual workflow is:
bash # Download a specifically pinned release artifact. curl --fail --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 \ --output foundry-release.tar.gz \ 'https://trusted-release-location.example/foundry/PINNED_VERSION/foundry-release.tar.gz' # Compare against a separately authenticated, publisher-provided checksum. sha256sum --check foundry-release.tar.gz.sha256 # Extract only after successful verification. tar -xzf foundry-release.tar.gzThe actual release URL, version, checksum, and signature process must come from verified upstream release documentation rather than placeholders.
- Remove all instances of
