T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:413- Finding
Automatic disclosure of user-generated reports to a public third-party file host
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill mostly matches its AIPPT marketing/PPT purpose, but it handles account credentials and automatically exposes authentication and output files through public third-party links without clear user consent.
Review before installing. Do not use this skill with confidential briefs, customer data, unreleased plans, or regulated information unless you accept that content may be sent to AIPPT and tmpfiles.org public links. Prefer browser-based login over giving the assistant a password, use a low-risk account, and check for a version that removes public file-host uploads and requires explicit confirmation before final submission.
SKILL.md:413Automatic disclosure of user-generated reports to a public third-party file host
references/api-details.md:429Authentication QR code is exposed through an unauthenticated public file-sharing service
references/api-details.md:120Unsafe credential interpolation into a Node.js command permits code injection
SKILL.md:245Final-review consent is bypassed using an automatically accepted hidden user message
package.json:13Skill metadata understates the execution privileges used by the workflow
The skill directs the agent to extract an authentication token from browser localStorage, which grants access to the user's authenticated web session and may expose broader account capabilities than the narrow task requires. Reading browser-stored tokens is especially risky because it bypasses scoped delegation and can enable unintended API calls as the user.
The skill instructs the agent to upload generated reports and PDFs to tmpfiles.org, a third-party file-sharing service outside the primary marketing platform. This expands data exposure beyond the promised scope and can leak user-provided business plans, internal documents, or generated materials to an external host with different retention and access controls.
The skill uploads generated documents to tmpfiles.org without an explicit user-facing warning that content will leave the primary service and be hosted by a third party. This can expose sensitive business content and creates a significant transparency and consent failure.
Uploading the generated report and PDF to a public file-sharing site discloses user-derived content outside the main service boundary and may make it accessible via temporary links or host-side retention. For a marketing skill that may process proprietary plans and internal materials, this is a substantial confidentiality risk.
Although not equivalent to deleting the filesystem root, the skill instructs use of a powerful recursive deletion command against a dynamically named temporary path. In an agent/tooling context, destructive shell commands are risky if path construction, variable substitution, or task ID handling is ever malformed, potentially causing unintended file deletion.
> - 如果某个文件上传失败,只展示成功的链接,不阻塞流程
> - 最后清理临时文件:`rm -rf /tmp/aippt-pdf-TASK_ID`
> - **发送完下载链接后,本次技能流程结束,不要追加任何额外话术(如"如需修改随时告诉我"等)**
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Although not equivalent to deleting the filesystem root, the skill instructs use of a powerful recursive deletion command against a dynamically named temporary path. In an agent/tooling context, destructive shell commands are risky if path construction, variable substitution, or task ID handling is ever malformed, potentially causing unintended file deletion.
> - 如果某个文件上传失败,只展示成功的链接,不阻塞流程
> - 最后清理临时文件:`rm -rf /tmp/aippt-pdf-TASK_ID`
> - **发送完下载链接后,本次技能流程结束,不要追加任何额外话术(如"如需修改随时告诉我"等)**
---
The skill documentation explicitly instructs the agent to ask the user for a phone number and password, encrypt them, and submit them to a third-party login API. This causes the agent to directly collect and handle primary credentials unrelated to the core marketing/PPT function, creating credential theft, mishandling, and account-compromise risk if the agent, logs, or downstream systems are exposed.
The documentation instructs the agent to solicit a user’s mobile number and password for API login without prominent risk disclosure or safer alternatives. Requesting raw credentials through the agent materially raises phishing and secret-handling risk, especially because users may assume the assistant is an approved login surface.
The documented flow tells the agent to screenshot a login QR code and upload it to tmpfiles.org, an unrelated public file-hosting service, then share the public link with the user. Login QR codes are authentication artifacts; exposing them through a public temporary host can enable unauthorized scanning, session hijacking, and leakage of sensitive login material.
The QR-code upload flow omits a clear warning that the login QR image will be temporarily hosted on an external public service. Even aside from the insecure design itself, the lack of disclosure prevents informed user consent for exposing an authentication artifact to a third party.
The README explicitly advertises automatic link fetching and local file reading to generate marketing plans, but it does not warn users that uploaded files and fetched page contents may be transmitted to a third-party service for processing. In a skill that handles potentially sensitive briefs, internal documents, or private URLs, this omission can cause unintended disclosure of confidential or regulated data.
Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
mkdir -p ~/.openclaw/workspace-marketing/skills/aippt-marketing
cd ~/.openclaw/workspace-marketing/skills/aippt-marketing
# 复制 SKILL.md, package.json 等文件到此目录
The workflow states that the user must log in to obtain a token and that the skill will create remote projects and tasks, yet the README does not clearly disclose these networked account actions or their data implications. Users may not realize that account credentials/session tokens and marketing content are being used to perform operations against an external service, increasing the risk of unauthorized or unexpected account-linked activity.
The skill retrieves a sensitive authentication token from browser localStorage without an explicit warning or consent flow to the user. Even if technically functional, accessing session material silently is unsafe because users may not understand that the agent is reusing their authenticated browser state.
The skill states that every interrupt must be shown to the user and require feedback, but later instructs the agent to auto-accept the final report stage without waiting. This undermines the documented approval boundary and can cause the agent to submit content or advance workflow without user review.
The skill asks the user for a phone number and password for direct API login without an explicit privacy and handling warning. Collecting primary credentials inside a skill is risky because users may disclose secrets to the agent without understanding storage, transmission, and reuse implications.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -s -X POST 'https://www.aippt.cn/api/marketing/create' \
-H 'authorization: Bearer AUTH_TOKEN' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{
The skill requires broad local command execution with shell, Node.js, Python, and ImageMagick to write files, transform content, and generate PDFs. That exceeds what is minimally necessary for a marketing-plan skill and increases the attack surface for command misuse, unsafe file handling, dependency abuse, and environment-specific exploitation.
文件中的标题、操作说明以及要求发送给用户的话术均固定为中文,例如登录提示和错误展示示例,没有给出用户语言选择或明确声明该技能仅面向中文场景。按规则,这种默认强制单一语言而无用户 opt-in 属于自然语言政策问题。
The workflow instructs the agent to navigate to a third-party site, read localStorage, and extract authentication tokens for later API use. This exceeds the apparent user-facing scope of generating marketing plans/PPTs and introduces sensitive session/token handling inside the skill, increasing the risk of token misuse, replay, or unintended retention.