Back to skill

Security audit

Shopflow Read-only Packet

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent read-only Shopflow integration guide, but it tells users to install and run mutable external code that was not bundled or pinned for review.

Install only if you trust the Shopflow repository at the exact code version you use. Prefer pinning a commit, reviewing the package scripts and lockfile, running with minimal filesystem and secret exposure, and verifying the exposed MCP tools before connecting it to an agent host.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
references/INSTALL.md:7
Finding

Unpinned External Repository and Dependency Execution

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: references/INSTALL.md:7-18, references/INSTALL.md:24-29, references/TROUBLESHOOTING.md:5-9, references/OPENCLAW_MCP_CONFIG.json:4-7, and references/OPENHANDS_MCP_CONFIG.json:3-6
Vulnerability Type: Supply-chain risk caused by installing and executing mutable external code
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

references/INSTALL.md:7-18:

markdown
1. Clone the public repository:

```bash
git clone https://github.com/xiaojiou176-open/shopflow-suite.git
cd shopflow-suite
pnpm install
  1. Start the read-only MCP surface:
bash
pnpm mcp:stdio
text

`references/INSTALL.md:24-29`:

```markdown
4. Verify the packet surface:

```bash
pnpm verify:catalog
pnpm verify:release-readiness
text

`references/TROUBLESHOOTING.md:5-9`:

```markdown
## 1. MCP will not start

- run `pnpm install`
- run `pnpm mcp:stdio`
- confirm the command is being run from the real Shopflow repo root

references/OPENCLAW_MCP_CONFIG.json:4-7:

json
"shopflow": {
  "command": "pnpm",
  "args": ["mcp:stdio"],
  "cwd": "/absolute/path/to/shopflow-suite"
}

references/OPENHANDS_MCP_CONFIG.json:3-6:

json
"shopflow": {
  "command": "pnpm",
  "args": ["mcp:stdio"],
  "cwd": "/absolute/path/to/shopflow-suite"
}

Technical Analysis

The installation procedure clones the default branch of an external GitHub repository without pinning a reviewed release tag or immutable commit hash. It then invokes pnpm install, which may execute dependency lifecycle scripts, followed by several scripts whose implementations are controlled by the downloaded repository.

The two MCP configurations also cause the host to execute the repository-defined mcp:stdio script whenever the Shopflow MCP server is launched. Consequently, the code that is ultimately installed and executed can change after this Skill package has ...[truncated 1801 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin the external repository to a reviewed, immutable commit hash rather than cloning and running its default branch directly.
  2. Publish versioned releases and require verification through signed Git tags, release signatures, or documented cryptographic checksums.
  3. Require a committed pnpm lockfile and use pnpm install --frozen-lockfile so dependency resolution cannot silently change.
  4. Audit all package lifecycle scripts. Where compatible, initially install with pnpm install --ignore-scripts and explicitly run only reviewed build steps.
  5. Document the expected contents or cryptographic hash of the mcp:stdio, verify:catalog, and verify:release-readiness script implementations.
  6. Enumerate and verify the exact MCP tools exposed by the reviewed server version before connecting it to an agent host.
  7. Run installation and the MCP server in a sandbox or container with minimal filesystem access, no unnecessary secrets, restricted network access, and a dedicated unprivileged account.
  8. Prefer distributing the reviewed server implementation with the Skill or referencing a reproducible, immutable release artifact.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep