T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:38- Finding
Unpinned Remote Repository Is Downloaded and Executed
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Locations:
SKILL.md:38-46manifest.yaml:27-32references/INSTALL.md:3-8
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution from a mutable, unpinned source
Risk Level: HighVulnerable code in
SKILL.md:38-46:bash git clone https://github.com/xiaojiou176-open/ui-automation-control-plane.git cd ui-automation-control-planebash ./scripts/setup.shVulnerable code in
manifest.yaml:27-32:yaml installation: repo: https://github.com/xiaojiou176-open/ui-automation-control-plane steps: - git clone https://github.com/xiaojiou176-open/ui-automation-control-plane.git - cd ui-automation-control-plane - ./scripts/setup.shVulnerable code in
references/INSTALL.md:3-8:bash git clone https://github.com/xiaojiou176-open/ui-automation-control-plane.git cd ui-automation-control-plane ./scripts/setup.shTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions clone the current default branch of an external GitHub repository and immediately execute its
scripts/setup.shfile. No immutable commit hash, signed release, checksum, or other integrity verification is specified.Consequently, the effective executable payload can change after this skill packet has been reviewed. The remote repository and setup script are not included in the audited artifact, so the behavior of that script cannot be established from the available project files. A compromise of the repository, its maintainer account, or its development workflow could replace the setup script or files invoked by it with attacker-controlled code.
The documented alternative,
pnpm install, also creates supply-chain exposure because dependency installation may run package lifecycle scripts. The instructions do not require a reviewed frozen lockfile or suppression of dependency scripts.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises t ...[truncated 1522 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
-
Pin the repository to a reviewed, immutable commit rather than executing the current default branch:
bash git clone https://github.com/xiaojiou176-open/ui-automation-control-plane.git cd ui-automation-control-plane git checkout --detach REVIEWED_COMMIT_SHA -
Verify the checked-out commit against a trusted, documented value before running any script:
bash test "$(git rev-parse HEAD)" = "EXPECTED_FULL_COMMIT_SHA" || exit 1 -
Prefer a cryptographically signed release or commit and document the exact signature-verification procedure.
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Publish and verify a checksum for any release archive or vendored setup script. Obtain the checksum through an independently trusted channel.
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Vendor the reviewed setup script into the skill package when practical so its exact contents are covered by the skill audit.
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Require users to inspect the setup script and all commands it invokes before execution. Avoid describing remote script execution as a routine trusted step.
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Require a committed, reviewed lockfile and use a frozen installation mode, such as:
bash pnpm install --frozen-lockfile -
Disable package lifecycle scripts where they are unnecessary:
bash pnpm install --frozen-lockfile --ignore-scriptsIf lifecycle scripts are required, explicitly enumerate and review the packages permitted to execute them.
-
Run installation in an isolated, least-privilege environment without production credentials, SSH agents, cloud tokens, or unrelated writable host directories.
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Update all duplicated installation instructions in
SKILL.md,manifest.yaml, andreferences/INSTALL.mdso they consistently enforce the pinned and verified installation process.
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