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Security audit

Phishing Reporter

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill has a legitimate anti-phishing purpose, but it can automatically submit consequential reports and user details to outside services without enough validation or final confirmation.

Install only if you are comfortable with the agent sending reported URLs, descriptions, and possibly contact details to outside abuse-reporting organizations. Before any submission, review the exact URL, hostname, category, destination service, and text being sent; avoid including private details unless necessary. For registrar lookup, prefer a web WHOIS/RDAP lookup or a safely parsed hostname rather than passing raw user input to a shell command.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:59
Finding

Potential Command Injection Through Unvalidated WHOIS Input

Content
View full analysis
` or use `https://who.is/` 2. Find "Registrar Abuse Contact Email" 3. Send abuse email with phishing URL and description ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill directs the Agent to substitute a domain derived from a user-provided URL into the shell command `whois `. It does not require the Agent to parse the URL with a structured URL parser, validate the resulting hostname, reject shell metacharacters, or execute WHOIS without a shell. If the Agent implements this instruction using shell-string interpolation, a crafted domain value containing command separators, substitutions, redirections, or whitespace may be interpreted as shell syntax rather than as a single WHOIS argument. The vulnerability therefore occurs at the boundary between attacker-controlled URL input and command execution. The issue is conditional on the Agent invoking the command through a shell. Using an argument-array process API without a shell would substantially reduce the risk, but the Skill does not impose that requirement. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker asks the Agent to report an allegedly malicious URL. 2. The supplied value contains shell syntax, such as a command separator or command substitution, while being presented as the domain to inspect. 3. The Agent follows the Skill and constructs a command equivalent to `whois `. 4. The Agent passes the interpolated string to a shell. 5. The shell interprets the injected syntax and executes the attacker's additional command. 6. The injected command runs with the operating-system permissions and environment access available to the Agent process. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could e ...[truncated 524 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

other

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:11
Finding

External Abuse Reports Can Be Submitted Without Target Validation or Final Confirmation

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases are broad enough to activate on common user language around URLs, scams, or reporting, which can cause the skill to run in contexts the user did not clearly intend. Because this skill performs external reporting actions, accidental invocation could lead to unintended disclosure of user-supplied URLs or submission to third-party services without sufficiently explicit consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to send user-provided URLs and descriptions to external abuse-reporting services, but it does not require a clear warning that this information will leave the local conversation context. Users may include sensitive details in the URL or description, and submitting them to third parties without explicit disclosure creates privacy and consent risks.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The NCSC workflow includes entering contact information into a third-party reporting wizard without an explicit privacy notice or consent requirement. This raises the risk of exposing the user's personal data or the agent's configured identity to an external government-operated service, especially if automation auto-fills or fabricates contact details.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs reporting suspicious URLs and related details to multiple third-party services, but it does not warn that submitted data will leave the current system and be shared with external organizations. In this context, users may provide not only the phishing URL but also descriptive details, screenshots, or related identifiers, creating a privacy and consent risk if the agent forwards that information automatically.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

The file points to ?hl=en and /en/ service URLs, which imposes English-language interfaces in the instructions. Because the document does not offer a language choice or explain why English is required, this can be a natural-language locale policy issue.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.