T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
Error
- Location
scripts/session-wrap-up.sh:35- Finding
Automatic Commit and Push Can Expose Sensitive Workspace Data
- Content
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/dev/null 2>&1; then # Add only text/config files git add *.md *.txt *.json *.sh *.yaml *.yml *.env 2>/dev/null || true git add docs/* scripts/* skills/* memory/* 2>/dev/null || true git add AGENTS.md USER.md SOUL.md MEMORY.md TOOLS.md 2>/dev/null || true git add projects/*/README.md projects/*/notes/* 2>/dev/null || true if [[ -n "$(git status --porcelain 2>/dev/null)" ]]; then echo "Committing text/config changes..." git commit -m "Auto-wrap-up: $(date -Iseconds)" 2>/dev/null || true if git remote get-url origin >/dev/null 2>&1; then git push origin HEAD 2>/dev/null && echo " ✓ Pushed to origin" || echo " ⚠ Push failed" fi ``` ### Technical Analysis The script indiscriminately stages broad classes of workspace files, including `.env` files, memory records, user-related files, agent instruction files, and tool configuration. These file categories are particularly likely to contain API keys, personal information, internal project details, or privileged agent state. The subsequent `git commit` does not limit the commit to files staged by this invocation. Any content already in the Git index is also included. The resulting commit is automatically pushed to the repository configured as `origin`, without validating whether the destination is trusted, private, or expected and without presenting the staged diff for user approval. Although shipping work is part of the declared functionality, automatically transmitting sensitive agent and environment files exceeds the minimum privileges necessary to commit ordinary work products. ### Attack Path 1. A secret, private memory entry, or sensitive instruction is s ...[truncated 1224 chars]- Remediation
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