swarm-executor

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 6:49 AM UTC
• Version: 1.1.0

Overview

The skill is purpose-aligned swarm coordination code, but its bundled deployment can expose coordination and monitoring services with weak defaults, so users should review it carefully before use.

Install or run this only in a controlled environment. Before using the Compose deployment, require non-empty Redis and Grafana secrets, bind services to loopback or an internal network, remove node-exporter unless host metrics are truly needed, pin Python packages and container images, and do not treat Redis connectivity alone as authorization to publish agent commands.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions

Findings (7)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: docker-compose.yml:5

Finding

Redis Exposed on All Host Interfaces with Optional Empty Authentication

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: docker-compose.yml, lines 5-14
Vulnerability Type: Exposed service with insecure authentication defaults
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

yaml

redis:
  image: redis:7.0-alpine
  container_name: swarm-coordinator-redis
  restart: unless-stopped
  ports:
    - "6379:6379"
  volumes:
    - redis-data:/data
  command: redis-server --appendonly yes --requirepass ${REDIS_PASSWORD:-}

Technical Analysis

The Redis service publishes port 6379 on every host interface. At the same time, REDIS_PASSWORD defaults to an empty value. Consequently, the deployment does not enforce a mandatory Redis credential.

Depending on how the deployed Redis version processes the empty --requirepass argument, the service may either operate without meaningful authentication or fail to start. If it operates without authentication, network access to the host is sufficient to access the coordination broker. Redis also stores persistent data through the redis-data volume.

Attack Path

1. An attacker identifies a host running the supplied Compose deployment.
2. The attacker connects to TCP port 6379, which is published on all interfaces.
3. Because a non-empty password is not mandatory, the attacker attempts an unauthenticated connection or uses the empty configured credential.
4. The attacker enumerates data, inspects coordination state, or publishes forged messages to known swarm channels.
5. Components trusting Redis messages process attacker-controlled coordination data.

Impact Assessment

A reachable attacker may obtain read and write access to the swarm message broker. This can enable disclosure of coordination data, forged task publication, workflow disruption, message injection, and manipulation of persistent Redis state. The scope includes all applications sharing this Redis instance.

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Remove the Redis host-port mapping when only Compose services require access.
• If host access is necessary, bind it explicitly to loopback, such as 127.0.0.1:6379:6379.
• Require a non-empty secret using ${REDIS_PASSWORD:?REDIS_PASSWORD is required}.
• Configure Redis ACLs with separate, least-privileged application users.
• Use TLS when Redis traffic crosses an untrusted network.
• Restrict access with host and cloud firewall rules.
• Modify the health check to authenticate with the configured Redis credential.
• Avoid placing credentials directly in process arguments where platform-level secret injection is available.

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error

• Location: coordinator/pubsub.py:64

Finding

Pub/Sub Messages Lack Authentication, Authorization, and Integrity Protection

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: coordinator/pubsub.py, lines 64-92
Vulnerability Type: Unauthenticated command-message publication
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

python

async def publish(self, channel: str, data: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
    """
    发布消息到指定频道
        
    Args:
        channel: 频道名称
        data: 消息数据
        
    Returns:
        bool: 发布是否成功
    """
    try:
        if self.backend == PubSubBackend.REDIS:
            return await self._publish_redis(channel, data)
        else:
            return await self._publish_memory(channel, data)
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"Error publishing message: {e}")
        return False

async def _publish_redis(self, channel: str, data: Dict[str, Any]) -> bool:
    """Redis后端发布消息"""
    try:
        message = json.dumps(data)
        await self.redis_client.publish(channel, message)
        return True
    except Exception as e:
        print(f"Redis publish error: {e}")
        return False

Technical Analysis

The publication path accepts an arbitrary channel and dictionary and directly serializes the data to Redis. It does not authenticate the claimed sender, authorize access to the selected channel, validate messages against the swarm command schema, verify a cryptographic signature, prevent replay, or impose a message-size limit.

Redis connectivity is therefore treated as sufficient authority to publish any coordination message. Although SwarmProtocol.validate_command exists elsewhere, this publication method does not invoke it. Validation only checks structure in any event; it does not establish the sender's identity or authority.

Attack Path

1. An attacker obtains access to the Redis broker, another process in the Compose network, or an application code path that exposes publish.
2. The attacker constructs a forged dictionary that claims to originate from a coo ...[truncated 697 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Authenticate every publishing agent using identities established outside message content.
• Implement role-based authorization for channels and message operations.
• Validate commands against the protocol schema before publication and again on consumption.
• Cryptographically sign messages and verify signatures before dispatching callbacks.
• Include authenticated sender identity, timestamps, unique nonces, and expiration times.
• Maintain a replay cache for processed message identifiers.
• Restrict channel names to an explicit allowlist.
• Enforce maximum serialized message sizes and bounded field lengths.
• Use Redis ACLs to restrict each service account to required channels and commands.
• Reject unknown, expired, malformed, or unauthorized messages rather than merely logging errors.

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: docker-compose.yml:55

Finding

Grafana Exposed with a Well-Known Default Administrator Password

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: docker-compose.yml, lines 55-64
Vulnerability Type: Default administrative credential
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code

yaml

monitor:
  image: grafana/grafana:latest
  container_name: swarm-coordinator-monitor
  restart: unless-stopped
  ports:
    - "3000:3000"
  environment:
    - GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD=${GRAFANA_PASSWORD:-admin}
  volumes:
    - grafana-data:/var/lib/grafana

Technical Analysis

The Grafana service publishes port 3000 on all host interfaces and uses admin when GRAFANA_PASSWORD is not supplied. This is a well-known default administrative password and is unsuitable for an exposed service.

An operator can launch the deployment without noticing that the default remains active. Network-level exposure then turns an unsafe development default into an externally exploitable authentication weakness.

Attack Path

1. An attacker scans the deployment host and discovers TCP port 3000.
2. The attacker opens the Grafana login interface.
3. The attacker attempts the default administrator credentials using the configured password admin.
4. If the deployment did not override GRAFANA_PASSWORD, the attacker obtains administrative dashboard access.
5. The attacker inspects monitoring data or changes dashboards, users, plugins, and data-source configuration according to the permissions available in the deployed Grafana version.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation grants administrative control over the Grafana instance. This can expose operational telemetry and configured data sources, permit monitoring-data manipulation, and provide information useful for attacks against connected services.

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Replace the fallback with ${GRAFANA_PASSWORD:?GRAFANA_PASSWORD is required}.
• Store the password in a managed secret rather than ordinary environment configuration where possible.
• Bind Grafana to loopback or place it behind an authenticated reverse proxy.
• Restrict network access to authorized administrative users.
• Disable anonymous access and review all Grafana authentication settings.
• Require a strong, unique administrator password and rotate any deployment that used the default.
• Add deployment checks that reject default or empty credentials.

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning

• Location: docker-compose.yml:90

Finding

Public Node Exporter Has Broad Read Access to Host Filesystems

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: docker-compose.yml, lines 90-107
Vulnerability Type: Excessive host visibility and exposed reconnaissance interface
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

yaml

node-exporter:
  image: prom/node-exporter:latest
  container_name: swarm-coordinator-node-exporter
  restart: unless-stopped
  ports:
    - "9100:9100"
  volumes:
    - /proc:/host/proc:ro
    - /sys:/host/sys:ro
    - /:/rootfs:ro
  command:
    - '--path.procfs=/host/proc'
    - '--path.rootfs=/rootfs'
    - '--path.sysfs=/host/sys'
    - '--collector.filesystem.mount-points-exclude=^/(sys|proc|dev|host|etc)($$|/)'

Technical Analysis

Node Exporter receives read-only access to the host root filesystem, /proc, and /sys, while its metrics interface is published on every host interface. Read-only mounts prevent direct modification through normal filesystem operations, but they still grant visibility into host resources far beyond the core swarm-coordination requirement.

Exported metrics may disclose operating-system characteristics, filesystems, mount points, interfaces, resource utilization, and other infrastructure details. Broad host mounts also increase the consequence of a vulnerability in Node Exporter or its container runtime environment.

Attack Path

1. An attacker discovers TCP port 9100 on the deployment host.
2. The attacker queries the unauthenticated Node Exporter metrics endpoint.
3. The attacker collects host metadata, resource information, filesystem details, and network characteristics.
4. The attacker uses this information to identify high-value services, capacity limits, host structure, and possible follow-on attack targets.
5. If a vulnerability exists in the deployed exporter version, the broad host-readable mount scope may increase the resulting disclosure.

Impact Assessment

The immediate impact is unauthorized infrastructure reconnaissan ...[truncated 211 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Do not publish port 9100 to external host interfaces.
• Place Node Exporter on a dedicated internal monitoring network.
• Restrict access to the Prometheus service through firewall or network policy.
• Enable only the collectors needed for the deployment.
• Mount only the minimum host paths required by enabled collectors.
• Run the container as a non-root user where supported.
• Use a read-only container filesystem, drop Linux capabilities, and apply seccomp or AppArmor profiles.
• Pin the image to a reviewed version and immutable digest.

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Warning

• Location: coordinator/negotiation.py:267

Finding

Administrative Negotiation Cancellation Relies on a Caller-Controlled Identifier

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: coordinator/negotiation.py, lines 267-295
Vulnerability Type: Identity spoofing and broken authorization
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

python

def cancel_negotiation(self, negotiation_id: str, canceller_id: str) -> bool:
    """
    取消协商

    Args:
        negotiation_id: 协商ID
        canceller_id: 取消者ID

    Returns:
        bool: 取消是否成功
    """
    with self._lock:
        if negotiation_id not in self.negotiations:
            return False

        negotiation = self.negotiations[negotiation_id]

        # 检查取消者权限（发起者或管理员）
        if canceller_id != negotiation.initiator_id and canceller_id != "001":  # CEO可以取消任何协商
            return False

        # 取消协商
        negotiation.status = NegotiationStatus.CANCELLED
        negotiation.result = {
            "cancelled_by": canceller_id,
            "timestamp": time.time(),
            "reason": "manual_cancellation"
        }

        return True

Technical Analysis

The method grants global cancellation authority when the supplied canceller_id equals the hard-coded string "001". It does not prove that the caller actually controls agent 001. The identifier is ordinary method input and therefore cannot serve as an authentication credential.

The same issue applies to the initiator check if an external caller can supply another negotiation's initiator identifier. Authorization decisions must use an authenticated principal established by the API, transport, or execution context—not a value supplied alongside the requested action.

Attack Path

1. An attacker reaches an API, message handler, or plugin that invokes cancel_negotiation.
2. The attacker obtains or guesses an active negotiation identifier.
3. The attacker submits "001" as canceller_id.
4. The hard-coded comparison treats the attacker as the privileged coordinator.
5. The negotiation is mark ...[truncated 549 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Remove canceller_id as a trusted authorization input.
• Pass an authenticated principal or security context into the method.
• Resolve agent identity and roles from a trusted registry.
• Enforce explicit role-based authorization for global cancellation.
• Require that ordinary agents can cancel only negotiations they initiated.
• Record immutable audit events containing the authenticated actor, request source, negotiation ID, and reason.
• Add tests proving that spoofed identifiers cannot obtain coordinator permissions.

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: docker-compose.yml:55

Finding

Container Images Use Mutable Latest Tags

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: docker-compose.yml, lines 55-92
Vulnerability Type: Mutable third-party container dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

yaml

monitor:
  image: grafana/grafana:latest

prometheus:
  image: prom/prometheus:latest

node-exporter:
  image: prom/node-exporter:latest

Technical Analysis

The deployment uses mutable latest tags for Grafana, Prometheus, and Node Exporter. A future image pull can therefore retrieve code that differs from the version reviewed during this audit. This prevents reproducible deployment and makes changes in behavior dependent on upstream tag movement.

The images are obtained from recognized registries rather than suspicious sources, so there is no evidence of a deliberately malicious dependency. Nevertheless, mutable tags create a supply-chain control weakness because an upstream compromise, accidental regression, or incompatible update can enter a deployment without a corresponding repository change.

Attack Path

1. An operator deploys or redeploys the project at a later date.
2. Docker resolves a latest tag to a new image manifest.
3. The new artifact differs from the one originally tested or audited.
4. The new image executes with the network exposure and mounted volumes defined in the Compose file.
5. A compromised or vulnerable upstream release can affect the deployment without any change to this repository.

Impact Assessment

Impact depends on the affected upstream image. Potential consequences include monitoring compromise, telemetry disclosure, service instability, or abuse of the broad host mounts assigned to Node Exporter. The weakness also prevents reliable rollback and forensic reproduction.

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Pin each image to a reviewed semantic version.
• Prefer immutable digest references, for example image: repository@sha256:....
• Scan images for known vulnerabilities before promotion.
• Use an internal registry or admission policy that permits only approved digests.
• Update images through a reviewed dependency-management process.
• Record image digests in release metadata to support rollback and incident investigation.

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Note

• Location: requirements.txt:1

Finding

Python Dependencies Are Unlocked and Permit Unreviewed Future Versions

Content

View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: requirements.txt, lines 1-9
Vulnerability Type: Non-reproducible third-party dependency resolution
Risk Level: Low

Vulnerable Code

text

redis>=4.5.0
jsonschema>=4.17.0
pydantic>=2.0.0
fastapi>=0.104.0
uvicorn>=0.24.0
python-dotenv>=1.0.0
pytest>=7.4.0
pytest-asyncio>=0.21.0
pytest-cov>=4.1.0

Technical Analysis

Every Python dependency has only a lower bound. There are no exact version pins, upper bounds, integrity hashes, or lock file. Installing the project at different times can therefore produce materially different dependency trees.

The listed package names are established packages and there is no evidence of dependency confusion or typosquatting. The risk arises from uncontrolled future resolution: incompatible, compromised, or newly vulnerable releases may be installed without review.

Attack Path

1. An operator or build system runs pip install -r requirements.txt.
2. The package resolver selects the newest versions satisfying the broad lower bounds.
3. Those versions may differ from the versions used during development and audit.
4. Package installation and subsequent application startup execute unaudited dependency code.
5. A compromised release or breaking update can affect the application and its data.

Impact Assessment

The exact impact depends on the dependency selected during installation. Potential effects include application compromise, denial of service, behavior changes, or exposure through newly introduced vulnerabilities. Reproducibility and incident response are also impaired.

Remediation

View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

• Generate a lock file containing exact transitive dependency versions.
• Require package hashes during installation.
• Separate runtime dependencies from development and test dependencies.
• Build and test updates in a controlled pipeline before deployment.
• Use vulnerability scanning and automated update tooling with mandatory review.
• Configure package installation to use trusted indexes and disable unintended extra indexes.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Excessive Agency: Unrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
• Memory Poisoning: Persistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection

Findings (38)

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

The supplied code implements only a generic Pub/Sub coordinator abstraction with Redis or in-memory backends. It can publish messages, register/unregister callbacks, count subscribers, list channels, and retrieve message history for the memory backend. While Pub/Sub could be a supporting component of a swarm system, the declared description claims substantially broader coordination features—multi-agent execution, command standardization, budget governance, status tracking, negotiation, fallback, and completion controls—that are not present in this code chunk. Therefore the description materially overstates the actual behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Memory Manipulation

High

• Category: Memory Poisoning
• Confidence: 80% confidence

Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 246)May include surrounding context.

md

Ask for human confirmation before swarm actions that are:

- destructive: delete data, remove files, reset state
- public: publish, message external users, send email
- costly: paid API calls, high-token parallel execution, cloud deployment
- irreversible: production migrations, permission changes, credential rotation

Possible Typosquatting: 'uvicorn' resembles popular package 'gunicorn'

High

• Category: Supply Chain
• Confidence: 70% confidence

Finding

Package name closely resembles a popular package, suggesting possible typosquatting. Attackers publish malicious packages with similar names to trick developers into installing them.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The code grants cancellation authority to a hard-coded agent ID ("001") regardless of the negotiation’s participant set or any external authorization context. In a multi-agent coordination system, this creates an undocumented privilege bypass: any actor able to claim or reuse that ID can cancel arbitrary negotiations, causing denial of service and undermining workflow integrity.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 91% confidence

Finding

The module docstring is written in Chinese and presents the protocol description only in that language. Under the policy for natural-language issues, forcing a single language without opt-in or documented justification is a locale/language constraint that may exclude users who did not choose Chinese.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The code advertises percentage-based tier quotas tied to a global budget, but enforcement only occurs when max_tokens is set; the configured percentage values are otherwise informational and do not restrict consumption. In a swarm coordinator, this can silently allow overuse of preferred models, defeating governance, cost controls, and any safety assumptions that rely on token isolation between tiers.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 91% confidence

Finding

The auto_downgrade routine claims to select the next available tier, but it only checks whether a tier has a configured percentage greater than zero and does not verify real remaining capacity or whether the candidate tier can satisfy the requested token amount. This can route work into exhausted or unusable tiers, causing budget bypass, failed requests, or unstable fallback behavior across coordinated agents.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

Multiple comments in the file are written only in Chinese, such as 'Redis服务（消息队列）', 'Swarm协调器API服务', and '监控服务（可选）'. This imposes a single language on operators or maintainers without offering a language choice or documenting a justified locale-specific constraint.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 93% confidence

Finding

The compose file deploys node-exporter with read-only mounts of /proc, /sys, and the host root filesystem, which grants containerized access to broad host telemetry outside the stated swarm-coordination function. Even read-only exposure can leak sensitive host metadata, mounted paths, kernel/runtime details, and infrastructure inventory that materially aids reconnaissance if the service is exposed or compromised.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 92% confidence

Finding

This JSON schema constrains the sender type to a fixed set of Chinese-language labels, which imposes a specific language on all conforming data. The file does not document any user opt-in, alternative locale support, or justification for this locale restriction.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 92% confidence

Finding

The target.type enum also requires Chinese-language role names, forcing a single language choice at the schema level. Because no opt-in or documented locale justification is present in this file, this is a natural-language policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 77% confidence

Finding

The config includes a model entry named "豆包", which introduces a language/locale-specific element in the skill configuration. Because this file provides no accompanying opt-in, user choice, or justification for the locale-specific configuration, it may conflict with policy guidance against forcing language or locale implicitly.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

This code file includes its primary natural-language interface elements, including the module docstring and many method docstrings/comments, exclusively in Chinese. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in or a documented regional justification is a locale-policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The module header and all user-facing/docstring natural-language content in this file are written in Chinese, which imposes a specific language/locale without any indication of user choice or opt-in. Under the stated policy, language constraints should either be optional or explicitly justified as region-specific.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

This code file's natural-language content is entirely in Chinese, including the top-level module description and API docstrings, with no indication that the skill is region-specific or that users can choose another language. Under the locale-policy rule, forcing a specific language without opt-in or justification is a policy concern.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The docstring for parse_response presents the function as parsing and standardizing an agent response, which implies producing a normalized result from the input. However, when a metadata field is present, the function updates the standardized response and then deletes response["metadata"], causing a side effect on the original input object that is not reflected in the documented intent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 84% confidence

Finding

The natural-language strings in the file, including the module docstring and class comments, are written exclusively in Chinese and present the skill behavior in that locale by default. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in or documented justification can be a locale-policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 84% confidence

Finding

The manifest focuses on coordination behavior such as Redis/in-memory PubSub orchestration, delegation, fallback, and completion gates. This compose file additionally deploys Grafana and Prometheus services, which are operational monitoring infrastructure rather than direct implementation details of swarm execution, and that broader platform scope is not mentioned in the description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 82% confidence

Finding

This YAML file contains natural-language service descriptions such as '监控服务（可选）', 'Prometheus（可选）', and 'Node Exporter（可选，用于主机监控）' without clearly specifying when these components should or should not be enabled. In a manifest-style file, such broad optional descriptions can leave trigger scope or deployment intent underspecified, increasing the chance of unintended use.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unpinned Dependencies

Low

• Category: Supply Chain
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The dependency is specified with a lower-bound only, which allows future installs to resolve to different versions over time. This weakens reproducibility and can unintentionally pull in vulnerable or breaking releases, especially for a coordination service that depends on network-facing libraries like redis.

Content

Scanner excerpt · requirements.txt (reported line 1)May include surrounding context.

text

redis>=4.5.0
jsonschema>=4.17.0
pydantic>=2.0.0
fastapi>=0.104.0

Unverifiable Dependency: redis has 4 known advisory(ies) (CVE-2023-28858 (redis-py Race Condition vulnerability); CVE-2023-28859 (redis-py Race Condition due to incomplete fix); CVE-2023-28858 (redis-py before 4.5.3, as used in ChatGPT and other products, leaves a connectio) +1 more), but the manifest does not pin a version, so it is unknown whether the installed release is affected

Low

• Category: Supply Chain
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The manifest does not pin redis, and the package has known advisories in some version ranges, so there is no reliable way to determine whether deployments are exposed. This matters more here because redis is central to Pub/Sub coordination and typically handles networked state and message flow.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unpinned Dependencies

Low

• Category: Supply Chain
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

Using an unpinned jsonschema version makes builds non-reproducible and may introduce vulnerable or incompatible releases without code changes. Although not directly exploitable by itself, it increases supply-chain risk and can affect validation logic relied on by the swarm protocol.

Content

Scanner excerpt · requirements.txt (reported line 2)May include surrounding context.

text

redis>=4.5.0
jsonschema>=4.17.0
pydantic>=2.0.0
fastapi>=0.104.0
uvicorn>=0.24.0

Unpinned Dependencies

Low

• Category: Supply Chain
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

A minimum-only pydantic spec permits installation of any later release, including versions with undiscovered or newly introduced flaws. In a multi-agent coordination skill that likely validates structured messages, unexpected parser behavior or vulnerable releases could have security consequences.

Content

Scanner excerpt · requirements.txt (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

text

redis>=4.5.0
jsonschema>=4.17.0
pydantic>=2.0.0
fastapi>=0.104.0
uvicorn>=0.24.0
python-dotenv>=1.0.0

Unverifiable Dependency: pydantic has 4 known advisory(ies) (CVE-2021-29510 (Use of "infinity" as an input to datetime and date fields causes infinite loop i); CVE-2024-3772 (Pydantic regular expression denial of service); CVE-2021-29510 (Pydantic is a data validation and settings management using Python type hinting.) +1 more), but the manifest does not pin a version, so it is unknown whether the installed release is affected

Low

• Category: Supply Chain
• Confidence: 93% confidence

Finding

Because pydantic is unpinned and has known advisories, the security posture of message validation cannot be verified from this file alone. In a swarm coordinator that likely parses untrusted structured inputs, validator vulnerabilities can have outsized impact such as denial of service or unsafe parsing behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unpinned Dependencies

Low

• Category: Supply Chain
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

FastAPI is typically exposed over HTTP, so leaving it unpinned increases the chance of silently adopting a release with security regressions or incompatible defaults. This is especially relevant for a swarm coordinator that may expose orchestration APIs.

Content

Scanner excerpt · requirements.txt (reported line 4)May include surrounding context.

text

redis>=4.5.0
jsonschema>=4.17.0
pydantic>=2.0.0
fastapi>=0.104.0
uvicorn>=0.24.0
python-dotenv>=1.0.0
pytest>=7.4.0

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.