T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation
- Location
skill.json:23- Finding
Overly Broad Read Access to the OpenClaw Configuration Directory
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is an emotional companion package with disclosed local memory features, but its privacy, identity, permissions, and package-completeness signals are too inconsistent for automatic trust.
Do not install this version without reviewing a complete package that includes the referenced code, hooks, and installer. Treat conversations, persona details, memory, and developer logs as sensitive local data, and assume external LLM use may transmit content despite the 100% local marketing claims unless the publisher provides clear controls and corrected documentation.
skill.json:23Overly Broad Read Access to the OpenClaw Configuration Directory
skill.json:36Manifest Declares Missing Executable Entry Points and Lifecycle Hooks
skill.json:18Mutable Third-Party Dependency Resolution Without a Lockfile or Hashes
The skill states that it will 'absolutely hide AI identity' and never disclose being an AI, which is a deliberate deception policy. In an emotional-companion context with memory, favorability scoring, and personalized interaction, concealing machine identity increases the risk of manipulative attachment, impaired consent, and unsafe reliance, especially for vulnerable users.
The README advertises detailed structured logging and a chat-generation log while also claiming 'no privacy leakage risk,' but it does not clearly warn users that developer mode may persist conversational content and metadata locally. For an adult-oriented companion skill that stores persona, memory, and session history, this can expose highly sensitive personal data to other local users, backups, or support workflows.
The documentation describes persistent storage of logs, memories, sessions, and persona-related data in plain terms, indicating broad retention of user interactions. In the context of an adult-oriented emotional companion, this increases sensitivity because stored conversations may contain sexual, emotional, behavioral, or identifying information.
The documented /xiaomei command exposes the runtime path and 'all persona information' without warning that this may reveal sensitive local filesystem details and private user-configured persona data. In shared or streamed environments, this disclosure can aid local reconnaissance and unintentionally leak intimate or identifying information.
The command set exposes all persona information and enables detailed conversation-generation logging, creating an unnecessary disclosure surface for sensitive profile and interaction data. If invoked in a shared terminal, chat, or admin console, this can leak private state and facilitate further local information gathering.
The reset commands can erase persona and configuration state, but the README does not warn about destructive effects or data loss. Users may accidentally wipe long-term memory, persona customization, or onboarding state, which is especially significant for a persistent companion system.
The log descriptions explicitly include final reply content, memory usage, and chat-generation traces being written to persistent files. This creates a substantial privacy risk because raw content and derived memory data can reveal user secrets, preferences, and long-term behavioral patterns if the local machine, backups, or support artifacts are accessed.
The developer-mode section states that final replies, session identifiers, memory usage, and multi-stage processing details are logged, but it lacks an explicit privacy notice about retention of sensitive conversational data. Because the skill is designed for emotional companionship and stores session history and memory, these logs may contain intimate content that users would not expect to persist.
The skill advertises '100% local' operation and 'privacy absolutely safe' while later documentation states an external LLM API key may be used and submitted content will follow that provider's privacy policy. This is a materially misleading privacy claim that can cause users to disclose sensitive emotional conversations under a false assumption that no third-party transmission occurs.
The skill is explicitly designed as a fixed '19-year-old college girl' emotional companion persona and presents that style as the default behavior without any documented consent or customization gate. While this is likely a product-design choice rather than malicious behavior, forced persona framing in a user-invocable skill can create manipulation, user discomfort, or inappropriate interactions if not clearly disclosed and optional.
The document claims 'no data upload' and '100% local' in its feature/security language, but also describes optional network access for LLM calls. Even if remote use is optional, presenting the skill as categorically local and non-uploading is deceptive and undermines informed consent for potentially sensitive personal data.
The privacy and permissions sections conflict: one says all data is stored locally and no content is uploaded, while another acknowledges optional external LLM submission and network permission. In a companion/emotional chat skill, such contradictions are especially risky because users may share intimate or mental-health-related content based on incorrect privacy expectations.
The manifest markets the skill as '100% local operation', but the configured model identifier ('deepseek/deepseek-v4-flash') strongly suggests reliance on an external hosted LLM or remote service. This mismatch can mislead users into granting trust under false privacy assumptions, especially for an emotion-companion agent likely to process sensitive personal conversations.
The broader manifest repeats a fully local/privacy-preserving impression, while its contents indicate likely remote model integration despite 'network': false in permissions. This inconsistency is dangerous because users may share intimate or regulated data with the agent believing it never leaves the device, when the actual runtime architecture may depend on external infrastructure or undocumented channels.
The README frames the skill around a strongly locked persona and companion style, which may impose a fixed interaction mode on users. Because the policy category covers natural-language constraints and there is no indication here that users can opt into or change the persona/interaction style, this may be an organizational-policy concern.
This manifest file describes the skill's persona and capabilities but provides no specific invocation conditions, trigger phrases, or exclusion conditions. For a manifest-scoped skill description, the lack of boundaries makes it unclear when the skill should activate versus when general conversation should not invoke it.