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Security audit

test-skill-vetter2

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a security checklist for vetting other skills and does not install code, persist itself, or request hidden access.

This skill is reasonable to install as a conservative review aid. Treat its checklist as guidance, not absolute policy, especially for benign cases like base64 decoding used only to inspect encoded content.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
• Installs packages without listing them
• Network calls to IPs instead of domains
• Obfuscated code (compressed, encoded, minified)
• Requests elevated/sudo permissions
• Accesses browser cookies/sessions
• Touches credential files
─────────────────────────────────────────
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
For GitHub-hosted skills:
```bash
# Check repo stats
curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/OWNER/REPO" | jq '{stars: .stargazers_count, forks: .forks_count, updated: .updated_at}'

# List skill files
curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/OWNER/REPO/contents/skills/SKILL_NAME" | jq '.[].name'
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
For GitHub-hosted skills:
```bash
# Check repo stats
curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/OWNER/REPO" | jq '{stars: .stargazers_count, forks: .forks_count, updated: .updated_at}'

# List skill files
curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/OWNER/REPO/contents/skills/SKILL_NAME" | jq '.[].name'
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Content
curl -s "https://api.github.com/repos/OWNER/REPO/contents/skills/SKILL_NAME" | jq '.[].name'

# Fetch and review SKILL.md
curl -s "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/OWNER/REPO/main/skills/SKILL_NAME/SKILL.md"
```

## Trust Hierarchy
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding
The document presents itself as a security-first vetting protocol, but the blanket statement at L045 actively conflicts with the surrounding intent to perform nuanced review based on purpose and scope. Base64 decoding is not inherently malicious and is often required to inspect encoded repository content, so this guidance contradicts the skill's stated vetting methodology rather than merely omitting nuance.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.