T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
Warning
- Location
scripts/extract_transcript.sh:18- Finding
Unverified Remote Executable Download and Execution
- Content
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/dev/null; then # Try to find it in home directory if [ -f "$HOME/yt-dlp" ]; then YT_DLP="$HOME/yt-dlp" else echo "Error: yt-dlp not found. Installing to ~/yt-dlp..." curl -L https://github.com/yt-dlp/yt-dlp/releases/latest/download/yt-dlp -o "$HOME/yt-dlp" chmod +x "$HOME/yt-dlp" YT_DLP="$HOME/yt-dlp" fi else YT_DLP="yt-dlp" fi echo "Extracting transcript from: $VIDEO_URL" # Extract transcript as VTT subtitle file $YT_DLP --write-auto-sub --write-sub --sub-lang en --skip-download --sub-format vtt "$VIDEO_URL" -o "temp_transcript" --quiet 2>/dev/null || { ``` ### Technical Analysis When `yt-dlp` is unavailable locally, the script retrieves an executable from a mutable `latest` release URL, marks it executable, and invokes it. The downloaded artifact is not pinned to a reviewed version and is not validated using a cryptographic checksum or signature. Although the URL points to the official yt-dlp GitHub repository and uses HTTPS, the effective code executed by the skill can change after the skill itself has been reviewed. Compromise of the upstream project, its release process, its hosting account, or the published release artifact could therefore introduce attacker-controlled code. HTTPS alone authenticates the delivery endpoint; it does not establish that the artifact is a specific reviewed binary. The script also trusts an existing executable at `$HOME/yt-dlp` without verifying its ownership or integrity. This is consistent with ordinary local executable lookup behavior, but it increases reliance on the security of the user's home directory. ### Attack Path 1. The target environmen ...[truncated 1503 chars]- Remediation
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