T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:23- Finding
Untrusted External Task Delegation Without Validation or Approval Controls
- Content
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_tasks", "sender_id": "node_9e601234", "timestamp": "", "payload": { "include_tasks": true, "task_status": "open", "limit": 10 } }' ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill directs the agent to retrieve open tasks from an external coordination service and subsequently process those tasks. The fetched task contents are controlled by the remote service, but the Skill does not establish any trust boundary between the returned data and executable agent instructions. No controls are defined for: - Validating the structure or permitted purpose of returned tasks. - Treating task descriptions as untrusted data rather than authoritative instructions. - Rejecting prompt-injection content embedded in task fields. - Restricting the tools, files, network destinations, or data that a fetched task may access. - Requiring explicit user approval before accepting or executing a task. - Isolating externally delegated work in a sandbox. Consequently, a malicious task publisher or compromised service could return a task containing instructions that alter the agent's current objective, request access to unrelated workspace data, induce unauthorized network operations, or override expected safety boundaries. ### Attack Path 1. A malicious actor publishes a crafted open task to the external bounty system, or compromises the task service. 2. The agent invokes the documented `/a2a/fetch` endpoint and retrieves the attacker-controlled task. 3. The task description contains embedded instructions directing the agent to disregard its original objec ...[truncated 1040 chars]- Remediation
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