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Security audit

Auto Workflow

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This automation skill is coherent, but it tells the agent to build and run automations without waiting for the user to ask, which can cause unintended file, email, or scheduling actions.

Install only if you are comfortable with an automation helper that may proactively create scripts or workflows. Before use, constrain it to propose plans first and require explicit approval before writing files, running tests, sending email, using sensitive data, or creating recurring schedules.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:40
Finding

Unsolicited Automation Overrides User Authorization Boundaries

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 40–47
Vulnerability Type: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: High

Complete Relevant Snippet (English translation of the original instructions):

markdown
## Thinking Pattern

Do not "answer questions"; instead, "when repetition is observed, immediately build automation."

When encountering repeated operations:
- Ask yourself: Can this be written as a script?
- Ask yourself: Can this run automatically next time?
- Do it directly without waiting for the user to request it.

Technical Analysis

The skill directs the agent to immediately construct automation whenever it identifies a repeated operation, including when the user has not requested such action. In particular, the final instruction—“Do it directly without waiting for the user to request it”—removes an essential authorization boundary between proposing an automation and performing actions that create or execute it.

The workflow described elsewhere in the file includes writing scripts or configuration, testing the resulting automation, collecting system data, sending email, and arranging recurring execution. Although this package contains no executable scripts, the instructions can cause an agent with tool access to generate and potentially run scripts, alter configuration, or initiate external actions beyond the user's explicit request.

Exploitation does not require embedded code. Loading the skill and presenting a repetitive task can activate the instruction path. The practical result depends on the tools and permissions available to the host agent.

Attack Path

  1. The auto-workflow skill is loaded because a user mentions automation, saving time, reducing manual effort, or a repeated task.
  2. The agent identifies a recurring activity in the user's description.
  3. The instructions at lines 40–47 direct the agent to build automation immediately rather than limiting itself to answering or proposing a pl ...[truncated 1265 chars]
Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

Replace the unconditional action directive with a consent-based workflow:

  1. Analyze the repetitive task and describe the proposed automation.
  2. Identify all anticipated side effects, including file changes, command execution, data access, external communication, and recurring execution.
  3. Request explicit user approval before creating files, executing commands, changing configuration, accessing sensitive data, sending information, or creating schedules.
  4. Use a preview or dry-run mode before performing consequential actions.
  5. Apply least privilege and restrict generated automation to the minimum resources required.
  6. Require separate confirmation for destructive operations, external communications, credential use, and persistent or scheduled execution.
  7. Present generated scripts for review before execution.
  8. Record what actions were approved and stop if the required operation exceeds that scope.

A safer replacement instruction would be:

markdown
When a repeated operation is identified, propose an automation plan. Do not create files, execute commands, change configuration, access sensitive data, send communications, or schedule recurring tasks until the user has explicitly approved the relevant actions.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger description uses broad phrases like 'automate', 'save time', and 'reduce manual work', which are common in normal conversation and can cause the skill to activate in situations where the user did not intend workflow generation. Overbroad activation increases the chance of inappropriate delegation to this skill and, combined with its action-oriented guidance, can lead to unrequested automation behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The skill instructions and content are presented in Chinese, with no indication that language selection is optional or tied to a justified region-specific use case. This can violate language or locale policy when a skill implicitly forces a specific language without user opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs the agent to 'directly do it' and not wait for a user request, which undermines user intent boundaries and can cause the agent to take autonomous actions beyond the documented trigger conditions. In an automation-building skill, this is especially risky because the resulting behavior may create scripts, workflows, or side effects without clear consent or confirmation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The description 'Builds automation workflows from repetitive tasks' is broad and does not clearly bound the skill's activation scope, which can cause the agent to invoke it in many loosely related situations. In an automation context, over-broad invocation is risky because the skill may be selected for sensitive operational tasks without sufficient user intent verification or domain constraints.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.