T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:32- Finding
Unverifiable Privileged Browser Extension Dependency
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 32–36
Vulnerability Type: Untrusted third-party browser extension distribution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code Snippet
markdown 1. 下载扩展包:`opencli-extension.zip`(已备份至 `D:\BaiduSyncdisk\Workbuddy\backup\`) 2. 解压到任意目录 3. 打开浏览器 `edge://extensions/` 或 `chrome://extensions/` 4. 开启右上角「开发者模式」 5. 点击「加载解压缩的扩展」,选择解压后的文件夹Technical Analysis
The Skill directs the user to install an unpacked Chromium extension in developer mode from a private backup location. It does not identify an official distribution URL, publisher, pinned version, cryptographic checksum, digital signature, source repository, required permissions, or verification procedure.
Loading an unpacked extension bypasses the provenance and update controls normally provided by a browser extension store. The resulting component is particularly sensitive because the Skill also states that browser automation reuses the user's authenticated browser state and supports arbitrary JavaScript evaluation in visited pages. A maliciously substituted archive could therefore execute with whatever browser permissions appear in its manifest and interact with authenticated websites.
The audit did not establish that the referenced archive is malicious. The vulnerability is the absence of controls that would allow users to authenticate this privileged dependency.
Attack Path
- An attacker replaces or modifies
opencli-extension.zipin the referenced backup location or supplies a counterfeit archive under the same name. - The user follows the documented instructions, enables developer mode, and loads the unpacked extension.
- The browser grants the extension the permissions declared in the substituted manifest.
- The extension observes or manipulates pages opened in the user's existing browser profile.
- If its permissions permit, it reads sensitive page content, monitors browsing activity, or initiates actions through authenticate ...[truncated 852 chars]
- An attacker replaces or modifies
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Distribute the extension only through an official browser store or a documented, authenticated project release channel.
- Pin the extension to a reviewed version rather than referring to an unversioned ZIP archive.
- Publish a SHA-256 or stronger checksum and require users to verify it before installation.
- Digitally sign release artifacts and document signature-verification steps.
- Link to the extension's source repository and identify the exact source commit used to build each release.
- Document and justify every requested browser permission, removing broad host permissions that are not essential.
- Replace the private Windows backup path with a reproducible official source.
- Advise users to install the extension in a dedicated browser profile containing only the accounts required for the task.
- Disable the extension when automation is not in use and avoid granting access to all sites by default.
- Add a pre-installation review step covering
manifest.json, background scripts, content scripts, network destinations, and update behavior.
