T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/setup.py:136- Finding
LLM API key is persisted in plaintext configuration
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is mostly coherent with its monitoring purpose, but it needs review because it can fetch arbitrary URLs, send collected content to external services, and store an LLM API key in plain text.
Install only if you are comfortable with a Chinese-focused monitoring tool that fetches configured sources and may send article content or summaries to an LLM provider and a Feishu webhook. Avoid entering an LLM API key into the setup wizard unless the plaintext config storage is fixed; prefer environment variables or a secret store. Do not add internal, localhost, cloud metadata, or untrusted URLs as sources, and review the webhook and LLM endpoints before enabling them.
scripts/setup.py:136LLM API key is persisted in plaintext configuration
scripts/fetcher.py:91Unrestricted source URLs permit server-side request forgery
scripts/license.py:97Predictable prefixes and universal keys bypass paid-license authorization
Credentials or environment variables flow to a network sink. This is a high-confidence indicator of credential exfiltration.
}
}
resp = requests.post(webhook_url, json=payload, timeout=10)
resp.raise_for_status()
print("[OK] 已推送到飞书")
return True
This finding indicates outbound LLM API calls via environment-configured endpoints that are not declared in permissions, while the claimed monitoring and push pipeline is not actually implemented. Hidden external transmission of collected content is a meaningful privacy and security risk, especially for industry monitoring workflows that may involve sensitive or proprietary material.
This finding indicates outbound LLM API calls via environment-configured endpoints that are not declared in permissions, while the claimed monitoring and push pipeline is not actually implemented. Hidden external transmission of collected content is a meaningful privacy and security risk, especially for industry monitoring workflows that may involve sensitive or proprietary material.
This finding indicates outbound LLM API calls via environment-configured endpoints that are not declared in permissions, while the claimed monitoring and push pipeline is not actually implemented. Hidden external transmission of collected content is a meaningful privacy and security risk, especially for industry monitoring workflows that may involve sensitive or proprietary material.
This finding indicates outbound LLM API calls via environment-configured endpoints that are not declared in permissions, while the claimed monitoring and push pipeline is not actually implemented. Hidden external transmission of collected content is a meaningful privacy and security risk, especially for industry monitoring workflows that may involve sensitive or proprietary material.
The skill advertises capabilities that imply network access, environment variable use, and local file I/O, but it does not declare any tool scope or permissions boundary. In agent ecosystems, missing explicit scope increases the chance of overbroad runtime access and makes it harder for users or reviewers to understand what the skill can actually do.
The example invocation “帮我监控这几个公众号” is a natural-language trigger that is broad and lacks constraints about scope, source types, or required context. The document does not provide negative examples or clearer activation boundaries, so this phrasing could collide with ordinary conversational requests.
The documentation mentions AI summarization and webhook integrations but does not clearly warn that monitored content may be transmitted to external LLM or messaging services. For a monitoring skill handling potentially sensitive business intelligence, undisclosed third-party transmission materially increases privacy and data leakage risk.
This JSON manifest is dominated by explicitly Chinese-language sources such as "36氪", "虎嗅网", and "InfoQ中文", which indicates a locale/language preference baked into the skill configuration. Because the file provides no natural-language notice, opt-in, or alternative language selection, it can violate the policy against forcing a specific language or locale without user choice.
The module docstring describes the skill entirely in Chinese, and the command-line help text later in the file is also Chinese-only. This imposes a specific language/locale on users without offering a language choice or documenting a justified regional constraint.
The manifest describes a skill that monitors information sources, summarizes content, and pushes results to messaging channels. In addition to URL deduplication, this file persists usage counters, enforces free-tier quotas, and activates a local license key, which are product licensing behaviors not implied by the stated monitoring workflow.
The offline license activation accepts any key beginning with "CNIM-", which makes privilege escalation to the pro plan trivial and defeats any meaningful authorization check. While this is primarily a business-logic flaw rather than a host-compromise issue, it enables unauthorized feature access and shows intentionally weak access control around paid functionality.
The module docstring and all operational messages are written only in Chinese, which imposes a specific language/locale on users. The file does not offer an opt-in language choice or explain that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking or region-specific context.
The file implements a local freemium licensing and activation system that is outside the declared monitoring/summarization/push functionality of the skill. This hidden monetization and feature-gating behavior changes the trust and operating model of the skill, and because activation is enforced purely through local state and hardcoded prefixes, it can mislead users about capability, provenance, and support expectations.
The module docstring and all user-facing instructions are written only in Chinese, and the command/help output likewise assumes Chinese-language users. The file does not offer an opt-in language choice or explain that the skill is intentionally limited to a Chinese-speaking or region-specific audience.
This code file contains user-facing natural-language strings in Chinese, beginning with the module description and continuing throughout console output. Under the policy rule, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a locale-policy violation when no alternative or justification is provided.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
}
}
resp = requests.post(webhook_url, json=payload, timeout=10)
resp.raise_for_status()
print("[OK] 已推送到飞书")
return True
The module docstring and all user-facing prompts are written exclusively in Chinese, presenting the setup flow as a fixed Chinese-language experience. The policy only permits locale constraints when the skill offers a language choice or clearly documents and justifies the restriction, which is not present here.
Dynamic import() can load arbitrary modules at runtime, bypassing static analysis and potentially importing malicious code.
"keywords": keywords,
"channels": channels,
"llm": llm_config,
"configured_at": __import__("datetime").datetime.now().isoformat(),
"version": "1.0.0"
}
The function sends article content and prompts to a third-party LLM endpoint configured by environment variable, but this file contains no consent gate, redaction step, or warning about external transmission. In a monitoring/summarization skill, sources may include proprietary, personal, or otherwise sensitive text, so silent export to external services can create confidentiality and compliance risk.
The prompt template says the model will summarize the article content shown under '内容(前2000字)', but the format call provides content_trunc while the template expects content_truncated. As written, the documented behavior of summarizing article content is contradicted by the implementation, which will fail before inserting the content.
The prompt requires a Chinese summary and the system prompt enforces JSON-only output tailored to that instruction, while the module description also emphasizes Chinese summaries. This imposes a specific language behavior without user opt-in or a documented region-specific justification.
The skill states that output may be written to ~/info-digest/ but does not clearly warn users that monitored content will be persisted locally. This can expose sensitive summaries or source material to other local users, backups, or later unintended access.
The top-level docstring is written only in Chinese and presents the skill as Chinese-specific, with no indication that language choice is optional or that the locale restriction is required for a region-specific purpose. This is a natural-language policy concern because it implicitly fixes the skill's language/locale without user opt-in.
The file’s primary natural-language description is entirely in Chinese and does not indicate that language is configurable or limited to a justified region-specific use case. Per the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a locale-policy violation.