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Security audit

feishu-voice-sender - 飞书语音消息发送

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches its stated Feishu voice-message purpose, but it can send content externally and leaves generated voice files on disk with weak scoping and disclosure.

Install only if you are comfortable with message text being processed by Edge TTS, sent to Feishu, and retained as generated audio files unless manually cleaned up. Prefer pinned dependencies, a virtual environment, narrower Feishu-specific triggers, and explicit confirmation before sending sensitive content.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:24
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/voice_sender.py:68
Finding

Generated Voice Messages Persist in Temporary and Outbound Storage

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
Findings (11)

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 9)May include surrounding context.

bash
pip install edge-tts
sudo apt-get install ffmpeg

使用

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

bash
pip install edge-tts
sudo apt-get install ffmpeg

使用

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises shell execution, environment access, and file-writing behavior through its installation and usage steps, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions. This creates a mismatch between what the skill can do and what users or a host framework may expect, increasing the risk of unintended command execution or filesystem side effects without clear consent boundaries.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The trigger phrases include generic terms such as “tts” and “文字转语音,” which are broad enough to match many normal user requests unrelated to Feishu delivery. Overbroad triggers can cause the skill to activate unexpectedly and send content to an external platform when the user only intended local text-to-speech generation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The feature list emphasizes one-click sending to Feishu but does not prominently warn users that their input text will be converted and transmitted externally. Without an explicit user-facing disclosure, sensitive internal messages, alerts, or personal data could be unintentionally sent to a third-party service or chat destination.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The natural-language descriptions, help text, and available voices are all fixed to Chinese usage, and the code does not present this as an optional locale setting or ask for user preference. This can violate language/locale policy when a skill forces a specific language without opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill sends arbitrary input text to the external Edge TTS service during synthesis, but the user-facing behavior does not clearly warn that message contents leave the local environment. In a messaging assistant context, users may paste sensitive internal or personal content, creating a real confidentiality risk through unintended third-party disclosure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes a Feishu voice sender based on Edge TTS, which clearly justifies text-to-speech generation and message sending, but it does not mention spawning local command-line tools. This file relies on external executables for media conversion and message delivery, which is a broader capability than the stated purpose and introduces operational power not disclosed in the skill description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/voice_sender.py (reported line 80)May include surrounding context.

python
"-ac", "1", "-ar", "16000",
        opus_file
    ]
    result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True)
    
    os.remove(mp3_file)  # 清理 MP3

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/voice_sender.py (reported line 133)May include surrounding context.

python
cmd.extend(["--media", target_file, "--message", "语音消息"])
        
        result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True)
        
        if result.returncode == 0:
            print("✅ 发送成功!")

Context-Inappropriate Capability

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The stated purpose is converting text to speech and sending it to Feishu, but the implementation also inspects runtime environment variables to determine the destination chat. While convenient for reply mode, environment-variable access is an additional capability not disclosed in the manifest description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.