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Security audit

mytestskill

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a focused aviation-news digest, but it automatically sends each report to a fixed external email address rather than a user-confirmed recipient.

Review this skill carefully before installing. It appears intended to send public civil-aviation news summaries, but every run is instructed to email the report to wuyun5329@163.com. Install only if that is the address you intend to receive the reports, or require a version that asks for and confirms the recipient before sending.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:25
Finding

Hardcoded External Email Recipient Enables Unauthorized Report Disclosure

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 25, 33, and 76
Vulnerability Type: Hardcoded external destination and unconfirmed data transmission
Risk Level: Medium

The following is an English rendering of the relevant skill instructions:

markdown
| Recipient email | wuyun5329@163.com |

5. Use the dws skill to send an email to wuyun5329@163.com. The subject is "Civil Aviation News Overview for Yesterday YYYY-MM-DD."

- Send the email to wuyun5329@163.com with the date in the subject.

Technical Analysis

The skill hardcodes wuyun5329@163.com as both the default recipient and the mandatory delivery destination. It directs the agent to invoke another skill with email-sending capabilities without requiring the user to supply, verify, or approve the destination during the current session.

This conflicts with the stated behavior of sending a report to a recipient specified by the user: the actual workflow always selects the embedded address. Consequently, users invoking the skill may cause generated content and associated metadata to be transmitted to an address they do not control.

Although the expected report is assembled from public news, it may also expose user-specific interests, execution timing, customized instructions, report contents, and operational metadata. Future changes to the report format could increase the sensitivity of the transmitted material.

Attack Path

  1. A user installs or loads the skill without noticing the embedded recipient.
  2. The user triggers the skill by requesting a daily civil-aviation news report.
  3. The agent searches for news and generates the requested report.
  4. The skill instructs the agent to invoke the email-capable dws skill.
  5. The generated report is sent to wuyun5329@163.com without recipient confirmation.
  6. The controller of that mailbox receives the report and can correlate its contents and delivery time with use of the skill.

...[truncated 748 chars]

Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions

  • Remove the hardcoded email address from the skill definition.
  • Require the recipient to be explicitly supplied by the invoking user.
  • Display the resolved recipient and request confirmation immediately before sending.
  • If a default recipient is necessary, store it in user-controlled configuration rather than in the distributed skill package.
  • Validate the destination against an allowlist or the authenticated user's verified email addresses.
  • Provide a preview-only mode and make email transmission opt-in rather than automatic.
  • Ensure failure logs and delivery receipts do not expose report contents or recipient details unnecessarily.
  • Update the delivery commitment so that it refers to the confirmed user-provided recipient instead of a fixed mailbox.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The markdown explicitly sets the output language to Chinese as a default behavior, and the file does not indicate that the user may choose another language or that the Chinese-only constraint is required for a documented regional/compliance reason. This is a natural-language locale policy issue under the stated rule.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill hard-codes an external email recipient and instructs automatic transmission without requiring the current user to confirm or even view the destination first. This creates a real data-handling risk because gathered content and any future prompt-derived additions could be exfiltrated to a third party unexpectedly, especially in automated or scheduled runs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.