T06 · System Persistence
- Location
memory/knowledge/agent-design/auto-tick-mechanism.md:18- Finding
Persistent Unattended Agent Execution with Broad Tool Authorization
- Content
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> /tmp/evo-skill-tick.log 2>&1 0 8 * * 1 cd /path/to/project && claude -p "/evo-skill-creator scan" --print >> /tmp/evo-skill-scan.log 2>&1 0 17 * * 5 cd /path/to/project && opencode run -m opencode/mimo-v2-pro-free "/evo-skill-creator review" >> /tmp/evo-skill-review.log 2>&1 0 * * * * cd /path/to/project && opencode run -m opencode/nemotron-3-super-free "/evo-skill-creator learn" >> /tmp/evo-skill-learn.log 2>&1 0 17 * * 5 cd /path/to/project && claude -p "/evo-skill-creator review" --print >> /tmp/evo-skill-review.log 2>&1 ``` The same document also presents `--dangerously-skip-permissions` as an available authorization option. ### Technical Analysis The document supplies directly actionable instructions for installing operating-system-level scheduled tasks. These tasks survive the original Skill invocation and automatically relaunch an AI agent in a non-interactive context. The first scheduled command preauthorizes a broad collection of capabilities: - Arbitrary shell interaction through `Bash` - File creation and modification through `Write` and `Edit` - Filesystem discovery through `Glob` and `Grep` - External network research through `WebSearch` and `WebFetch` This is especially risky when combined with the behavior in `SKILL.md:47-48`, where high-priority backlog items may be executed without first asking the user. Although the persistence document asks the owner to confirm whether scheduling should be configured, the recommended authorization scope exceeds the minimum privileges needed for simple periodic status checks or resear ...[truncated 1677 chars]- Remediation
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