T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
install.sh:9- Finding
Mutable Remote Payload Is Downloaded and Installed Without Integrity Verification
- Content
View full analysis
- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill appears to do local image-to-PDF conversion, but its installer fetches mutable remote code and unpinned Python packages, so users should review it before installing.
Review before installing. Prefer installing from a pinned release or reviewed local copy, avoid running install.sh as an administrator, use an isolated virtual environment with pinned dependencies, and ask the agent not to automatically open generated PDFs unless you explicitly want that.
install.sh:9Mutable Remote Payload Is Downloaded and Installed Without Integrity Verification
install.sh:31Unpinned Python Packages Are Installed Into the Invoking Environment
scripts/slice_n_pdf.py:176Predictable Shared Temporary Files Expose Sensitive Image Data to Local Races
scripts/slice_n_pdf.py:256Cleanup Recursively Deletes a Pre-Existing Destination Directory
The declared purpose is local image-to-PDF conversion, but the skill also includes downloading code from GitHub, unpacking into ~/.qclaw/skills/, and installing packages with pip3. That mismatch is dangerous because agents or users may trust the skill as a simple local formatter while it performs supply-chain and system-modifying operations outside the stated scope.
The skill explicitly instructs use of shell commands (python, open, bash, curl, unzip, pip3) but does not declare any tool scope or allowed-tools metadata. This creates an authorization and transparency gap: an agent may execute filesystem and process-launching actions that users or the platform did not clearly consent to.
The guardrail tells the agent to always run open <path> after generation, which launches a local application and causes side effects beyond the core task of producing a PDF. Automatic app launching can expose sensitive documents on screen, trigger risky file handlers, or violate user expectations in unattended environments.
The skill directs the agent to open the generated PDF without warning or confirmation. Forced execution of a viewer command is a security-relevant side effect because it bypasses user consent and may reveal privileged legal evidence or trigger downstream application behavior.
The installation instructions download an archive from GitHub via curl, unzip it into a live skills directory, and install Python packages with pip3. This is a classic supply-chain risk: remote content may change, be tampered with, or introduce malicious code, and the writes/installations affect the local environment beyond the user's immediate conversion task.
bash install.sh
curl -fsSL https://github.com/wux818738-alt/openclaw-skill-image-paginator/archive/refs/heads/main.zip -o /tmp/skill.zip unzip /tmp/skill.zip -d ~/.qclaw/skills/ pip3 install fpdf2 Pillow
The installer fetches code from a remote GitHub ZIP at install time and also installs Python packages from the network without pinning versions, integrity verification, or any trust prompt. This creates a supply-chain risk: if the repository, transport path, or dependency resolution is compromised, arbitrary code could be installed under the user's account.
The script unconditionally removes the existing skill directory with rm -rf and does not ask for confirmation or create a backup. While this is not code execution, it can cause unintended data loss or destroy local modifications if the path already contains user data.
This curl command pulls executable installer content from an external source, which is risky because the downloaded archive is later unpacked and installed without authenticity or integrity checks. In the context of a simple image-to-PDF skill, network retrieval is operationally understandable for installation, but it still expands the attack surface and enables supply-chain compromise.
# 下载 zip
echo " ⬇️ 下载: $ZIP_URL"
curl -fsSL "$ZIP_URL" -o "$ZIP_FILE"
# 解压(自动解压到 image-paginator-main/)
UNZIP_DIR=$(mktemp -d)
Dynamic import() can load arbitrary modules at runtime, bypassing static analysis and potentially importing malicious code.
# ── CLI ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def main():
ap = (
__import__("argparse")
.ArgumentParser(
description="Tile long image(s) into a numbered grid PDF.",
)
Natural-language policy violations include forcing a specific language or locale without user opt-in. The description and major workflow sections present the skill in Chinese for a specific audience, but the file does not explicitly offer the user a language choice or document that the locale constraint is required.
All user-facing messages, comments describing purpose, and usage examples are presented only in Chinese. This imposes a single language on users without an opt-in or alternative, which can violate language/locale policy when the skill is not clearly documented as region-specific.
The inline comment 参数校验 is written only in Chinese, introducing a language-specific instruction/context in a file that otherwise uses English and does not state any locale choice or justification. This can violate a language/locale policy that requires neutral language or user opt-in for a specific locale.