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Security audit

Video Classifier

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill automates a logged-in staff video backend and can bulk apply tags, but its instructions can tag more records than requested without a clear final approval.

Review before installing. This should only be used by someone authorized to change the target staff video backend, and it should be updated to preview affected records, enforce the exact requested count, log affected IDs, and obtain explicit confirmation before clicking the final confirm action.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:33
Finding

User-Provided Classification Count Is Ignored During Bulk Modification

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 33–38
Vulnerability Type: Unbounded bulk data modification
Risk Level: Medium

Vulnerable Code

markdown
4. **Select all videos**: Use `browser.check` to check all matching videos

5. **Submit**: Use `browser.click` to:
   - Click [Add to structure]
   - Select the tag
   - Click Confirm

The displayed interface labels have been translated into English without changing the meaning of the source instructions.

Technical Analysis

The Skill description states that the user provides both a tag and the number of videos to classify. Its examples also pass explicit limits such as count=20 and count=200. However, the mandatory workflow does not validate, apply, or enforce this count.

Instead, line 33 directs the Agent to select every video matching the filters. Lines 35–38 then direct it to confirm a state-changing classification operation. Consequently, the affected-record scope is determined by the filter result rather than the limit authorized by the user.

The batching recommendation elsewhere in the file does not correct the vulnerability because it is advisory, does not bind the cumulative number of selected records, and does not require verification before submission.

Attack Path

  1. A user requests classification of a limited number of videos, such as 20.
  2. The configured filters return more than the requested number.
  3. The Agent follows the mandatory instruction to select all matching videos.
  4. The Agent invokes the add-to-structure operation and confirms it.
  5. Every matching record is modified, exceeding the scope requested by the user.

Exploitation does not grant additional system privileges, but it can cause an authenticated Agent to perform a broader backend mutation than the user authorized.

Impact Assessment

The vulnerability affects the integrity of video classification data in the authenticated bac ...[truncated 513 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Parse and validate the requested count as a positive integer before accessing the backend.
  2. Reject missing, invalid, zero, negative, or unreasonably large count values.
  3. Select exactly the requested number of records rather than using a global select-all action.
  4. If pagination is required, track the cumulative selection count across pages and stop when the requested limit is reached.
  5. Before submission, compare the selected-record count with the user-requested count and abort on any mismatch.
  6. Show the final tag, filter criteria, and affected-record count and obtain explicit confirmation before performing the bulk mutation.
  7. Process large requests in bounded batches while ensuring that the cumulative total never exceeds the authorized count.
  8. Record the affected record identifiers or preserve an audit log so unintended changes can be identified and reversed.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to perform bulk backend actions that modify video records by selecting all matches and applying tags, but it provides no user warning, dry-run, scope validation, or confirmation before committing changes. In the wrong context, this can silently mislabel large numbers of videos, corrupt workflow state, and create operational or compliance issues that are difficult to reverse.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill description contains many broad trigger phrases such as generic classification and tagging requests, which can cause the agent to invoke this skill in situations beyond the user's precise intent. Because the skill performs backend modifications, overly loose routing increases the chance of unintended destructive or unauthorized tagging actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The instruction to 'Do NOT ask the user to do manual steps' pushes the agent toward fully autonomous execution of a real-world backend workflow without an approval checkpoint. In a skill that can change production metadata at scale, reducing human verification makes accidental misuse, overreach, and unsafe assumptions substantially more likely.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 9)May include surrounding context.

md
# Video Classifier Skill

**IMPORTANT: Use the browser tool to automate this workflow. Do NOT ask the user to do manual steps.**

## Backend Info
- URL: https://staff.bluemv.net/d.php

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.