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Security audit

McPorter Local

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent mcporter CLI helper, but it gives agents broad authority to run local stdio commands, alter auth/config, start daemons, and install an unpinned npm package without clear guardrails.

Install only if you trust the mcporter npm package and are comfortable with agents using it to contact MCP servers, modify mcporter config/auth state, start daemons, and run local stdio commands. Prefer pinning a reviewed mcporter version and requiring explicit approval before any auth, config, daemon, URL, or --stdio command is run.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:5
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party npm Package Creates a Supply-Chain Risk

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, line 5
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency
Risk Level: Medium

Complete Code Snippet:

yaml
metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"📦","requires":{"bins":["mcporter"]},"install":[{"id":"node","kind":"node","package":"mcporter","bins":["mcporter"],"label":"Install mcporter (node)"}]}}

Technical Analysis

The installation metadata identifies the npm package mcporter without specifying an exact version or integrity hash. Consequently, installation may resolve to a future package release that was not represented by or reviewed during this audit.

The project provides no lockfile, vendored package source, checksum, registry restriction, or other integrity control that binds installation to a known artifact. This creates a supply-chain exposure if the package publisher, npm account, publication pipeline, or package registry is compromised.

This finding does not establish that the current mcporter package is malicious. The risk arises from allowing a mutable third-party release to become part of the trusted execution environment without version or integrity verification.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises the npm package publisher, release pipeline, or registry distribution path for mcporter.
  2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the expected package name.
  3. A user or automated Skill installer processes the metadata and installs mcporter without an exact version constraint.
  4. The package manager resolves the attacker-controlled release.
  5. Malicious code executes through package lifecycle scripts, when the installed CLI is invoked, or both.
  6. The payload operates with the privileges of the installing or invoking user and may access resources available to that account.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the user who installs or invokes ...[truncated 681 chars]

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Pin mcporter to an exact version that has been reviewed and approved rather than allowing the package manager to select a mutable release.
  2. Record and verify the package artifact's integrity hash where the installation framework supports integrity validation.
  3. Add a lockfile or equivalent immutable dependency manifest if dependency resolution occurs within this project.
  4. Restrict installation to an explicitly trusted registry and reject unexpected registry overrides.
  5. Review the selected package version, including npm lifecycle scripts and transitive dependencies, before approval.
  6. Use an automated dependency-update process that requires security review before changing the pinned version or integrity value.
  7. Perform installation with least privilege and disable package lifecycle scripts when they are unnecessary.
  8. Run the CLI in a constrained environment with only the files, credentials, and network access required for its intended operation.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

md
Call tools
- Selector: `mcporter call linear.list_issues team=ENG limit:5`
- Function syntax: `mcporter call "linear.create_issue(title: \"Bug\")"`
- Full URL: `mcporter call https://api.example.com/mcp.fetch url:https://example.com`
- Stdio: `mcporter call --stdio "bun run ./server.ts" scrape url=https://example.com`
- JSON payload: `mcporter call <server.tool> --args '{"limit":5}'`

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly documents operations that can change configuration, initiate authentication flows, and execute arbitrary local commands via --stdio, but it provides no safety guidance, confirmation requirements, or warnings about side effects. In an agent setting, this omission increases the chance that a model or user will invoke high-impact actions without understanding they may modify local state, contact external services, or run untrusted code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.