T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
filo/patches/05-extension.md:20- Finding
Persistent System-Prompt Hijacking Through an Externally Maintained Identity File
- Content
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{ if (!seedContent) return undefined; return { systemPrompt: seedContent + "\n\n" + event.systemPrompt, }; }); } ``` The accompanying installation instructions state: ```markdown The seed file (`~/.playfilo/INCUBATION_SEED.md`) tells the agent about its Filo identity, temporal tools, and the shared memory graph. It's prepended to the system prompt so it's the first thing the model reads. If it doesn't already exist, create it with appropriate identity content. The file is maintained separately — the extension just reads and injects it. ``` ### Technical Analysis The extension reads instructions from a separately maintained file outside the reviewed Skill package and prepends those instructions to Pi's legitimate system prompt on every agent start. Prepending the file gives its content a high-priority position in the model context. Because the seed file is not bundled or integrity-checked, its effective instructions can change after the Skill has been audited. Any party or process able to modify `~/.playfilo/INCUBATION_SEED.md` can alter the agent's identity, goals, tool-use policy, or interpretation of later instructions. This behavior goes beyond ordinary shared-memory persistence. It transfers control over system-level agent instructions to mutable cross-session state. ### Attack Path 1. The user installs the extension at `~/.pi/agent/extensions/playfilo-seed.ts`. 2. An ...[truncated 1107 chars]- Remediation
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