T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/videogen.py:88- Finding
Bearer API Key Disclosure Through an Unrestricted API Base URL
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is mostly a disclosed AI-HIVE video-generation workflow, but it has under-scoped credential and file-write risks that users should review before installing.
Install only if you trust AI-HIVE and will keep generation commands pointed at the official service. Do not use custom --base-url or AI_HIVE_BASE_URL with a real API key, avoid running it on sensitive media without understanding that files may be uploaded, and set --no-download or a controlled output directory until the download path handling is fixed.
scripts/videogen.py:88Bearer API Key Disclosure Through an Unrestricted API Base URL
scripts/videogen.py:319Unvalidated Server-Controlled Downloads Can Escape the Output Directory and Overwrite Files
The skill is presented as a tightly scoped video-editing workflow, but observed capabilities include broader generic chat/image/model/account functions without the specialized validation it promises. That combination increases the risk of unauthorized or deceptive media generation because users may believe the skill checks consent, branding, continuity, or reference rights when it does not.
The skill is presented as a tightly scoped video-editing workflow, but observed capabilities include broader generic chat/image/model/account functions without the specialized validation it promises. That combination increases the risk of unauthorized or deceptive media generation because users may believe the skill checks consent, branding, continuity, or reference rights when it does not.
The skill is presented as a tightly scoped video-editing workflow, but observed capabilities include broader generic chat/image/model/account functions without the specialized validation it promises. That combination increases the risk of unauthorized or deceptive media generation because users may believe the skill checks consent, branding, continuity, or reference rights when it does not.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
python3 scripts/videogen.py init --skill-name video-outfit-scene-light-edit-ai-hive
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
python3 scripts/videogen.py init --skill-name video-outfit-scene-light-edit-ai-hive
The implementation materially differs from the declared skill purpose: the manifest advertises AI-HIVE-based outfit/scene/light generative editing, but the code is only a local ffmpeg helper for trim, aspect, mute, loudness normalization, concat, and probe. This mismatch is dangerous because downstream systems or reviewers may trust the skill to enforce the advertised workflow, authorization checks, and external API handling when none of that exists, creating policy bypass, misuse, and supply-chain trust issues.
The skill advertises executable workflows and includes commands that rely on environment variables, file I/O, network access, and shell execution, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. In an agent environment, this can cause overbroad capability exposure, making it easier for the skill to access local files, invoke external services, or execute commands beyond what users expect.
The activation criteria include broad phrases such as generative editing and requests to turn reference cases into original content with scripts, prompts, code, or task lists. Overbroad triggers can cause the skill to activate in contexts it cannot safely or accurately handle, increasing the chance of inappropriate use for copyright-sensitive, deceptive, or policy-evasive media tasks.
The default prompt explicitly requires a production-ready Chinese workflow, which imposes a language choice regardless of user preference. This is a natural-language policy concern because the file does not offer a language choice or justify a mandatory locale.
The skill enables implicit invocation (allow_implicit_invocation: true) but the metadata does not define narrow activation constraints beyond a broad description. That increases the chance the agent will trigger this skill in ambiguous contexts and automatically produce workflow/code for powerful external video-editing operations without explicit user confirmation. In a media-editing skill, mistaken activation can facilitate unauthorized image/video manipulation or policy-sensitive synthetic content generation.
subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.
def run(args: list[str]) -> None:
print(" ".join(args))
subprocess.run(args, check=True)
def main() -> None:
The file is presented as a narrowly scoped video outfit/scene/light editing skill, but its top-level module and CLI expose a generic AI-Hive client with chat, image generation, model enumeration, upload, and account-query features. This scope expansion increases attack surface and can enable use cases outside the user-approved purpose, undermining least-privilege and policy containment.
The natural-language docstring and all user-facing CLI messages are presented only in Chinese, with no indication that the user can choose another language. This can violate language or locale policy where skills must not force a specific language without opt-in.
The standalone text-chat capability is unrelated to the declared video editing task and broadens what the skill can do beyond user expectations. Even if not invoked by the skill-specific CLI, bundling it in the same tool creates an avoidable capability expansion that may be exposed through alternate execution paths or future integration mistakes.
Standalone image generation is outside the declared scope of a video outfit/scene/light editing skill and meaningfully expands the operational surface. This violates least-functionality expectations and can let the skill be repurposed for unrelated content generation without separate review or user consent.
The upload flow sends local media files to a remote API/object store without any explicit confirmation, warning, or prominent disclosure at the point of use. Because this skill handles potentially sensitive videos, images, and audio, silent transmission can cause privacy and confidentiality harm if users assume processing is local or do not realize third-party storage is involved.
The get_user_info endpoint and corresponding CLI command retrieve user information and wallet balance, which are account-management capabilities rather than video outfit/scene/light editing functions. The manifest discusses media upload, configuration lookup, pricing snapshot, routing, polling, and downloads for generation tasks, but not viewing account profile or wallet data.
The polling flow creates the output directory and writes downloaded files to the user's Downloads path by default. While download progress is printed during execution, the script does not clearly warn in top-level help or documentation that invoking generation will automatically save files locally unless --no-download is used.
The file presents a constrained skill-specific parser while still embedding a broader generic AI toolset in the same module. This mismatch increases the risk of accidental exposure, maintenance drift, or alternative invocation paths that bypass the intended narrow interface.