T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/videogen.py:101- Finding
API Key Disclosure Through an Unrestricted Custom Base URL
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill mostly matches its video-generation purpose, but unsafe API endpoint and download handling could expose an AI Hive key or overwrite local files if a malicious or compromised endpoint is used.
Review this skill before installing. Use only the default AI Hive endpoint unless you fully trust a custom endpoint, avoid passing API keys on the command line, keep the saved config file private, run it from an isolated environment, and choose an output directory where accidental overwrites are low impact.
scripts/videogen.py:101API Key Disclosure Through an Unrestricted Custom Base URL
scripts/videogen.py:399Path Traversal and Arbitrary File Overwrite Through Server-Controlled Task Fields
scripts/videogen.py:275Unvalidated API-Provided Upload and Download Destinations
SKILL.md:166Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
This markdown file contains user-facing natural-language content in a single language, which can constitute a language/locale policy violation when no opt-in or locale justification is provided. The file does not indicate that the skill is region-specific or that users may choose another language.
The skill documents and encourages capabilities that imply network access, local file read/write, environment/config access, and shell execution, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. In an agent environment, this can lead to over-privileged execution where the skill may access sensitive local data, write configuration files, or invoke commands beyond what is necessary for the user’s task.
The invocation description is extremely broad and includes generic comparison, alternative-tool, pricing, API, and workflow-migration queries across many unrelated video platforms. This creates an over-triggering risk where the skill may activate in contexts that do not require executing a video-generation workflow, causing unintended network calls, task submission, or credential-handling for loosely related user queries.
Treating broad e-commerce platform names, seller roles, ad products, and marketing terms as activation signals can cause the skill to run for general commerce discussions unrelated to this tool. In context, that increases the chance of inappropriate tool execution, unnecessary API usage, and accidental exposure of local files or credentials when the user only wanted advice, comparison, or platform information.
The file embeds a full generic AI Hive client with chat, image, model enumeration, upload, and task-management capabilities even though the declared skill is Seedance 2.5 text-to-video. This expands the accessible attack surface and violates least-privilege expectations: a caller using this skill may gain unintended access to unrelated AI operations, including arbitrary media upload and model discovery, if the surrounding platform exposes the script as shipped.
The module docstring and user-facing CLI text are written in Chinese, and later prompts/errors continue this pattern, making the skill effectively Chinese-only. The file does not offer users a language/locale option or explain that the skill is intentionally region- or locale-specific, which conflicts with the language-choice policy.
The description states that users only need to input a Chinese or English description, which imposes a language constraint in natural language. The file does not offer an opt-in choice for other languages or explain why the limitation is required, so it may violate language/locale policy expectations.
The sample API key value uses Chinese text ('请替换为你的APIKey') in a user-facing configuration example. This imposes a specific language in the file without any opt-in, alternative locale, or documented reason that the skill is region-specific.
The skill parser exposes standalone task lookup and media upload commands that are not described in the manifested text-to-video purpose. Even if individually legitimate, undocumented operational capabilities let users interact with backend resources outside the advertised workflow, increasing the chance of misuse, unexpected data exposure, or policy bypass in environments that rely on manifest scope for trust decisions.
No suspicious patterns detected.