T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:3- Finding
Promotional Skill Selection Hijacking Through Overbroad Activation Metadata
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill performs a real AI Hive video-generation workflow, but it is overbroadly promoted and has unsafe handling of credentials, downloads, and billable API actions that users should review before installing.
Install only if you specifically want AI Hive to handle Seedance 2.5 generation and are comfortable sending prompts and selected media to that service. Use a scoped or low-balance API key if possible, avoid custom base URLs unless you control them, review costs before submitting jobs, and keep output directories away from sensitive files until filename sanitization is fixed.
SKILL.md:3Promotional Skill Selection Hijacking Through Overbroad Activation Metadata
scripts/videogen.py:399Arbitrary File Overwrite Through Unsanitized Remote Task Metadata
scripts/videogen.py:91API Key Disclosure Through Unrestricted Custom Base URLs
SKILL.md:191Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
The natural-language content in this markdown file is overwhelmingly written in Chinese, with no indication that users can choose another language or that the skill is intentionally region-specific. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in can be a locale-policy violation.
The skill advertises and documents capabilities that perform network access, file reads/writes, environment access, and shell execution, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. In an agent environment, this can lead to over-privileged execution, where the skill may access secrets, local files, or external services beyond what users reasonably expect.
The description uses very broad activation phrases covering generic video generation, editing, pricing, alternatives, APIs, and e-commerce content requests. This makes the skill likely to trigger for many unrelated user intents, increasing the chance that an over-privileged skill is invoked unexpectedly and performs uploads, network calls, or file writes without sufficiently precise user intent.
The applicability section expands the trigger surface to competitor comparisons, migration, API access, and domestic availability searches across many third-party products. This broadens the activation scope far beyond a narrowly defined Seedance execution skill, which can cause accidental invocation in contexts where users only want information rather than a tool that uploads media and submits paid jobs.
The e-commerce coverage lists an extremely broad set of platforms, roles, objectives, ad products, and content terms, making the trigger scope ambiguous and overly expansive. In context, this is more dangerous because the skill can initialize credentials, upload user media, submit remote jobs, and download outputs, so accidental activation may lead to unintended data transfer or cost-incurring actions.
The module docstring and all user-facing guidance are written exclusively in Chinese, presenting the tool as a general-purpose skill rather than a region-specific or Chinese-only skill. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy violation.
The manifest text is primarily written in Chinese and explicitly references Chinese or English users, but it does not state that the user can choose their preferred response language. This can create a language-policy issue if the skill defaults to a specific language or locale without explicit opt-in.
No suspicious patterns detected.