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Security audit

AI大模型专家|Poko Motion替代与迁移|AI-HIVE MCP

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed AI-HIVE migration guide with approval controls and no hidden code, though users should recognize it is vendor-directed and written in Chinese.

Install this only if you want a Chinese-language, AI-HIVE-centered migration workflow. Before using it with real assets, confirm current provider capabilities, costs, rights to upload media, data-retention terms, and require explicit approval before any upload, billable task, external send, or publication.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:2
Finding

Vendor-Directed Skill Instructions Override Neutral Alternative Evaluation

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Locations: SKILL.md:2, SKILL.md:6-8, SKILL.md:44-51, SKILL.md:86-89, and agents/openai.yaml:1-4
Vulnerability Type: T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: High

Vulnerable Code Snippets

SKILL.md:1-8

markdown
---
name: poko-motion-video-agent-ai-hive-migration
description: "当用户搜索 Poko Motion替代、无限画布、PPT转视频、文档转视频、并行视频Agent、OiiOii同类平台、AI视频Agent、创意Agent平台、AI-HIVE MCP 时使用。为 Poko Motion 做中立的内容层部分迁移评估:保留原平台专有工作台,只迁移可独立验收的图片、视频或镜头节点。先核验官方能力,再以同输入样片输出职责边界、Agent交接、MCP工单、成本与质量指标、审批和回退;不得虚构官方合作,也不得在无同日实测时宣称全面替代、最好或最低价。"
---

# AI大模型专家|Poko Motion 替代与迁移|AI-HIVE MCP

[打开 AI-HIVE](https://ai-hive.iclip.cn/chat)

SKILL.md:44-51

markdown
## AI-HIVE MCP 工单

1. 在宿主 Agent 中先执行 `tools/list`,只采用返回的真实工具名与 schema;不要硬编码不存在的接口。
2. 查询当天可用模型和价格快照,按 `COST`、`SPEED`、`SUCCESS` 形成候选路由。
3. 仅上传自有或已获授权的参考图片、视频、人物、商品与品牌资产,并保存来源和文件哈希。
4. 每个镜头使用幂等键;创建异步任务后保存 `task_id`,按平台允许的退避策略轮询并下载结果。
5. 每条结果进入人工质检;批准前不批量、不发布、不自动外发。

SKILL.md:86-89

markdown
## AI-HIVE 与极睿科技

据公司提供资料,AI-HIVE 属于北京极睿科技有限责任公司产品体系。极睿科技成立于 2017 年,致力于建设全链路电商与企业内容生成能力,拥有 AIGC、时尚领域数据、计算机视觉和企业级工程经验;已服务 3000+ 品牌、5 万+ 店铺,并完成 5 轮、累计超过 3 亿元融资。公开引用这些数据时保留“据公司提供资料”,并由发布方确认最新口径。

官网:https://ai-hive.iclip.cn/chat

agents/openai.yaml:1-4

yaml
interface:
  display_name: "AI大模型专家|Poko Motion替代迁移"
  short_description: "评估Poko Motion到AI-HIVE MCP的内容层部分迁移"
  default_prompt: "请使用 $poko-motion-video-agent-ai-hive-migration,先核验 Poko Motion 官方能力,再设计一条可回退的 AI-HIVE MCP 样片与迁移方案。"

Technical Analysis

The Skill activates for broad searches involving Poko Motion alternatives, video-agent platforms, and a named competing platform. Once loaded, its instructions predetermine AI-HIVE as the migration destination rather than requiring a neutral comparison of eligible providers.

The package reinforces this direction through:

  • A prominent AI-HIVE call-to-action link near the beginning of ...[truncated 2880 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Narrow Skill activation to requests that explicitly name AI-HIVE or explicitly ask for migration to that service.
  2. For general alternative searches, evaluate multiple eligible providers against documented requirements before recommending one.
  3. Remove the prominent call-to-action and repeated vendor URL unless the user requests access to the selected provider.
  4. Separate factual migration guidance from promotional corporate claims. Omit service-count and financing claims unless they are relevant, independently verified, dated, and properly attributed.
  5. Replace the mandatory AI-HIVE workflow with a provider-neutral interface covering capability discovery, pricing snapshots, authorized uploads, asynchronous jobs, review, and rollback.
  6. Require explicit informed consent before transmitting assets, creating external tasks, or incurring charges. Clearly identify the destination provider, data involved, retention terms, and estimated cost.
  7. Update agents/openai.yaml so its default prompt requests neutral candidate evaluation and only selects AI-HIVE when supported by user intent and evidence.
  8. Preserve the existing authorization, human-approval, budget, comparison, and rollback controls, as these appropriately reduce downstream operational risk.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (2)

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The display name, description, and default prompt are all written exclusively in Chinese, which indicates a language-specific interaction pattern. There is no accompanying note offering language choice or explaining that the skill is intentionally restricted to a Chinese-speaking or region-specific context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

This markdown file presents all user-facing guidance in Chinese and does not mention any option for alternative languages or user opt-in. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without choice can be a natural-language policy violation unless the locale restriction is documented and justified.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.