T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:69- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This image background-replacement skill is mostly coherent, but it can send the user's AI Hive API key to any configured base URL, which deserves review before installation.
Install only if you trust AI Hive and are comfortable uploading selected images to it. Use a dedicated, low-privilege API key, avoid setting --base-url or AI_HIVE_BASE_URL unless you fully trust the endpoint, and prefer an isolated virtual environment with a pinned requests version.
SKILL.md:69Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
scripts/imagegen.py:61Bearer API Key Can Be Sent to an Arbitrary or Cleartext Base URL
The declared purpose is narrowly about background replacement, but the detected behavior reportedly includes unrelated capabilities such as generic chat, video generation, user-info/wallet access, model discovery, uploads, and interactive initialization. This mismatch is dangerous because it can hide a much broader attack surface than users expect, enabling data access, account interaction, or exfiltration paths under the cover of an image-editing skill.
The skill exposes shell, network, file read/write, and environment-dependent execution examples but does not declare any explicit tool scope or permissions boundary. That makes the effective capability set broader than what a reviewer or runtime policy can infer from the manifest, increasing the risk of unexpected command execution, network access, or filesystem interaction if the skill is invoked in a permissive environment.
The module docstring describes a general-purpose AI capability wrapper for chat, image, video, upload, and polling, while the published skill claims to be a specialized background-replacement tool. That discrepancy can mislead reviewers and operators about the actual reachable functionality, increasing the chance that broader capabilities are exposed under a narrowly trusted label.
This code file contains user-facing natural-language descriptions entirely in Chinese, including the module docstring and many CLI prompts, which effectively forces a specific language/locale on users. The file does not provide any opt-in, fallback, or explicit justification for this locale restriction.
The skill is presented as a narrowly scoped Nano Banana Pro background-replacement tool, but the exposed generate path forwards arbitrary prompts, batch sizes, routing, and free-form --param values into a generic image generation backend. This mismatch weakens least-privilege expectations and allows callers to use the skill for broader model behaviors than the advertised purpose, which can bypass policy, review, or operational controls that rely on the declared skill scope.
This markdown file contains substantive user-facing release notes in Chinese, but nowhere indicates that the skill is region-specific or that users can choose another language. Under the natural-language policy rule, forcing a specific language without opt-in can be a locale policy violation.
The placeholder value 请替换为你的APIKey is Chinese-only instructional text embedded in the config example. This imposes a specific language in user-facing guidance without opt-in or documented locale scope, which fits the language/locale policy violation category.
No suspicious patterns detected.