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Security audit

AI大模型专家|MagicLight Animation Agent替代与迁移|AI-HIVE MCP

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed AI-HIVE migration-planning skill with no executable code or persistence, though users should understand it is provider-specific and may activate broadly.

Install this only if you want a MagicLight-to-AI-HIVE migration workflow. Before using it with real projects, confirm the user has chosen AI-HIVE, review any provider claims, and require explicit approval before uploading media assets or starting billable generation jobs.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:49
Finding

Provider-Specific Skill Instruction Hijacking Through Mandatory AI-HIVE Routing

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (4)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The description contains a wide set of generic trigger phrases such as replacement, animation, AI video agent, and related platform terms, which can cause the skill to activate for broad user queries beyond the narrowly intended migration-assessment scenario. Over-broad activation can route unrelated conversations into a vendor-specific workflow, increasing the risk of misapplied guidance, unintended data handling, and user manipulation through context hijacking.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding

The skill description is written as mandatory Chinese-language behavior without indicating user choice, fallback behavior, or a hard locale requirement. This can override user preference or system language expectations, creating prompt-routing and trust issues where users receive constrained or inaccessible responses that do not match their requested language or context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The display name, description, and default prompt are all written in Chinese, which indicates the skill is oriented toward a single language. There is no visible opt-in, language selection, or justification that this is a region-specific skill, so this may violate language/locale policy requirements.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The default prompt invokes a broad skill reference without explicit trigger conditions, scope limits, or safety boundaries. This can cause the agent to over-apply the migration workflow, make unsupported capability claims, or act on loosely related requests without sufficient user confirmation, which is especially risky in a vendor-comparison and migration-assessment context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.