T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
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SKILL.md:69- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation
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``` ### Technical Analysis The documented installation process retrieves `requests` without specifying an audited version, lock file, package hash, or trusted artifact. The installed package and its transitive dependencies therefore depend on mutable package-index state at installation time. Although the audit found no evidence that the current `requests` package is malicious, this practice leaves the installation workflow exposed to supply-chain compromise. A compromised release, maintainer account, package index, dependency, or package-resolution path could cause unreviewed code to be installed. Because `scripts/imagegen.py` imports `requests` at startup, malicious package code could execute in the user's Python process. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a relevant package release, transitive dependency, package-index account, or package-resolution path. 2. The user follows the documented `pip3 install requests` instruction. 3. `pip` resolves and installs the attacker-controlled or compromised release because no version or hash constrains the artifact. 4. The user runs `scripts/imagegen.py`. 5. Python imports the installed package, allowing malicious initialization code to execute with the privileges of the user running the skill. 6. Such code could access data available to that user, including environment variables, local files, and the AI Hive configuration file. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation would execute code with the operating-system privileges of the user who installed or ran the skill. The potential scope includes: - Reading the AI Hive API key from environment variab ...[truncated 516 chars]- Remediation
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