T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
scripts/ai_hive_hotspot.py:25- Finding
API Credential Disclosure Through an Unrestricted Endpoint Override
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
scripts/ai_hive_hotspot.py, lines 25–29
Vulnerability Type: Unvalidated destination for authenticated requests
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
python base = os.environ.get("AI_HIVE_BASE_URL", DEFAULT_BASE).rstrip("/") url = f"{base}/openapi/v1/models" if args.type: url += "?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"modelType": args.type}) req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {key}", "Accept": "application/json"})Technical Analysis
The
modelscommand obtains the destination base URL directly from theAI_HIVE_BASE_URLenvironment variable without validating its scheme, hostname, port, or embedded credentials. It then attaches the value ofAI_HIVE_API_KEYas a bearer token to a request sent to that destination.If an attacker can influence the process environment or provide a malicious execution wrapper, the authenticated request can be redirected to an attacker-controlled server. That server would receive the API key in the
Authorizationheader. The weakness crosses a credential trust boundary: a credential intended for the legitimate AI-HIVE service can be forwarded to an arbitrary endpoint.Attack Path
- The attacker gains the ability to influence
AI_HIVE_BASE_URL, such as through a compromised shell profile, CI/CD variable, container configuration, wrapper script, or copied command. - The attacker sets the variable to an endpoint under their control, for example
https://attacker.example. - The victim retains a valid secret in
AI_HIVE_API_KEYand runs themodelssubcommand. - The script constructs
https://attacker.example/openapi/v1/models. - It sends an HTTP request containing
Authorization: Bearer <AI_HIVE_API_KEY>. - The attacker records the header and attempts to use the exposed credential against the legitimate AI-HIVE service.
Exploitation requires influence over the command's envi ...[truncated 672 chars]
- The attacker gains the ability to influence
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the
AI_HIVE_BASE_URLoverride if alternate service endpoints are not a required feature. - If configurability is required, parse the URL and enforce:
- The
httpsscheme. - An explicit allowlist of trusted hostnames.
- Approved ports only.
- No embedded username or password.
- No fragments or unexpected path components.
- The
- Disable automatic redirects or validate every redirect destination before following it. Never forward the
Authorizationheader to a host outside the allowlist. - Bind credentials to endpoint-specific configuration rather than combining an arbitrary base URL with a globally sourced API key.
- Fail closed with a clear error whenever endpoint validation fails.
- Document that endpoint overrides are security-sensitive and should only be supplied through trusted deployment configuration.
- Rotate any API key that may have been used while an untrusted
AI_HIVE_BASE_URLwas configured, and review service-side usage and billing logs for misuse.
- Remove the
