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Security audit

AI电商专家|多平台电商内容适配

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s ecommerce image/video workflow is mostly coherent, but it uses an unpinned external MCP package with broad inherited environment access and automatic invocation enabled.

Review this before installing if your agent environment contains sensitive environment variables or if you do not want a skill that can be invoked implicitly for paid ecommerce content generation. Use a scoped token, run it in a clean environment, and prefer pinning or reviewing the external MCP package before use.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (5)

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs use of shell commands, local file paths, and environment variables, but does not declare corresponding permissions or capability boundaries. This can lead to users or host runtimes granting broader access than expected, reducing transparency and weakening security review of token handling and filesystem access.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The manifest markets the skill as automatically using only create_image_expand_task, but the body also documents listing tools, checking credits, and querying tasks. This mismatch creates a deceptive interface contract: integrators may approve a narrower capability set than the skill actually encourages, increasing the chance of unintended data access or operational actions.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The documentation expands the skill into video-generation operations even though its primary declared scope is image expansion and multi-platform image adaptation. Scope drift matters because it can introduce new billing, content, and abuse risks that reviewers and users would not expect from the manifest alone.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill enables implicit invocation without defining trigger phrases, user-intent boundaries, or scope constraints. This can cause the agent to activate in contexts the user did not clearly request, leading to unintended tool use, content generation, or cross-context prompt injection exposure, especially because the skill is designed to operate on ecommerce assets and workflows.

Env Variable Harvesting

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
def invoke(method: str, params: dict | None = None) -> dict:
    npx, token = require_runtime()
    env = os.environ.copy()
    env["MCP_TOKEN"] = token
    env["API_URL"] = os.environ.get("IMIVA_API_URL", os.environ.get("API_URL", DEFAULT_API_URL))
    proc = subprocess.Popen(
Confidence
67% confidence
Finding
os.environ.copy()

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.