T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
detect-flicker.ts:39- Finding
CLI-Controlled JavaScript Injection in Browser Initialization Script
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
detect-flicker.ts, lines 39–44 and 99–102
Vulnerability Type: JavaScript injection through unsafe string interpolation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
typescript async function detectFlicker(url: string, expectedTheme: string = 'dark'): Promise<FlickerResult> { const browser = await chromium.launch(); const context = await browser.newContext(); // Set theme preference BEFORE page loads await context.addInitScript(`localStorage.setItem('theme', '${expectedTheme}');`);The interpolated value originates from a command-line argument:
typescript // Main const url = process.argv[2] || 'http://localhost:3000'; const theme = process.argv[3] || 'dark'; detectFlicker(url, theme)Technical Analysis
The
expectedThemevalue is incorporated directly into a string containing executable JavaScript. It is not escaped or restricted to the intended values, such asdarkandlight.A malicious argument containing a quote and additional JavaScript can terminate the string passed to
localStorage.setItemand append arbitrary statements. Playwright then installs the resulting source as an initialization script usingcontext.addInitScript. That script executes whenever a page is created or navigated within the browser context.Because the injected script runs in the target page's browser context, it receives the origin-level capabilities available to ordinary page JavaScript. The vulnerability does not directly grant operating-system command execution, but it can expose page content and origin-accessible data.
Attack Path
- An attacker obtains control over, or influences, the third command-line argument passed to
detect-flicker.ts. - The attacker supplies a value that closes the quoted theme value and appends JavaScript.
- The value is inserted into the initialization-script source without validation or escaping.
...[truncated 1208 chars]
- An attacker obtains control over, or influences, the third command-line argument passed to
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
Do not construct executable JavaScript by concatenating or interpolating untrusted values. Pass the theme as a structured Playwright argument:
typescript await context.addInitScript( theme => localStorage.setItem('theme', theme), expectedTheme );In addition, enforce an explicit allowlist before creating the browser context:
typescript type Theme = 'dark' | 'light'; function parseTheme(value: string): Theme { if (value !== 'dark' && value !== 'light') { throw new Error('Theme must be either "dark" or "light"'); } return value; } const theme = parseTheme(process.argv[3] || 'dark');Apply both controls: the allowlist enforces the intended interface, while structured argument passing prevents source-code injection if accepted values are expanded later.
