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Security audit

timeseries-detrending

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward macroeconomic time-series detrending guide with only ordinary Python package dependencies noted.

Install the listed Python packages in a virtual environment and consider pinning versions if you need reproducible or organization-controlled analysis environments.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:124
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 124–127
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned and unverified third-party dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

markdown
## Dependencies

Ensure these packages are installed:
```bash
pip install statsmodels pandas numpy
text

### Technical Analysis

The documented installation command retrieves `statsmodels`, `pandas`, and `numpy` without version constraints, integrity hashes, a lockfile, or an explicitly trusted package index. As a result, dependency resolution is mutable: the versions and transitive dependencies installed can change each time the command is executed.

Python package installation may execute package build or installation logic in the invoking user's environment. Although the specified package names are consistent with the skill's legitimate functionality and no malicious package is directly referenced, the absence of version and integrity controls creates supply-chain exposure. A compromised package release, package index, maintainer account, or transitive dependency could introduce unauthorized code.

### Attack Path

1. A user follows the dependency installation instruction in `SKILL.md`.
2. `pip` queries its configured package index and resolves the latest compatible versions of the named packages and their transitive dependencies.
3. An attacker compromises a resolved release, its maintainer account, the configured index, or another dependency-distribution component.
4. The compromised package is downloaded because no reviewed version or cryptographic hash is enforced.
5. Malicious build or installation code executes with the privileges of the user running `pip`.
6. The installed malicious component can subsequently execute when imported by the documented Python workflow.

This path requires compromise or manipulation of the dependency supply chain; the audited file does not itself contain an active malicious payload.

### Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could execute 
...[truncated 483 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  1. Move dependencies into a reviewed requirements or lock file and pin exact versions.
  2. Record and enforce package hashes, for example:
    bash
    python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
  3. Pin and hash all transitive dependencies, not only the three direct dependencies.
  4. Generate the lock file through a controlled dependency-review process and update it only after security testing.
  5. Configure an explicitly trusted package index or an organization-controlled mirror rather than relying on ambient pip configuration.
  6. Recommend installation in a dedicated virtual environment using a non-privileged account:
    bash
    python -m venv .venv
. .venv/bin/activate
python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt
  7. Add automated dependency vulnerability and integrity checks to the maintenance workflow.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.