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Security audit

seisbench-model-api

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward SeisBench usage guide with a normal package install step and no hidden or unrelated behavior.

Install only from a trusted Python package index, preferably inside a dedicated virtual environment, and pin `seisbench` plus dependencies if reproducibility or supply-chain review matters. Expect the library to download and cache pretrained model weights when those models are first used.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:9
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation

Content
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Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 9-12
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency installation
Risk Level: Medium

text
The recommended way is installation through pip. Simply run:
bash
pip install seisbench

Technical Analysis

The installation instruction retrieves the latest package version and its transitive dependencies from the package index without enforcing reviewed versions or cryptographic hashes. Consequently, the installed artifacts can change after this Skill has been audited.

If the package, one of its dependencies, or the configured Python package index is compromised, a malicious artifact could execute code during installation or when the package is imported. The instruction does not recommend a lockfile, hash verification, an isolated environment, or validation of the package source.

Attack Path

  1. An attacker compromises a future seisbench release, one of its transitive dependencies, or a package index trusted by the victim's pip configuration.
  2. A user or agent follows the Skill and runs pip install seisbench.
  3. Because no version or hash is specified, pip resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled artifact.
  4. Malicious code executes during package installation or subsequent import and use.
  5. The code operates with the permissions of the account running pip or the resulting Python process.

Impact Assessment

Successful exploitation could provide arbitrary code execution with the privileges of the installing user. Depending on those privileges and the environment, the attacker could read or modify accessible files, steal environment variables or credentials, alter the Python environment, tamper with model outputs, or establish additional persistence. The scope is generally limited to resources available to the pip or Python process, but it may be broader if installation is performed by a privileged account.

Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin seisbench to a reviewed, explicitly tested version rather than installing the latest mutable release.
  • Maintain a lockfile that constrains all transitive dependency versions.
  • Require cryptographic hashes, such as with pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt, to verify downloaded artifacts.
  • Confirm and document the official package name and trusted package index.
  • Recommend installation inside a dedicated virtual environment or container under a non-privileged account.
  • Establish a dependency update process that includes provenance checks, vulnerability scanning, and review before changing pinned versions.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep