T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
install.sh:35- Finding
Unverified Remote pip Bootstrap Is Executed Directly
- Content
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/dev/null; then echo "Bootstrapping pip..." curl -sSL https://bootstrap.pypa.io/get-pip.py | python fi ``` ### Technical Analysis The installer streams a mutable script from an external URL directly into the Python interpreter. The downloaded content is neither saved for inspection nor validated using a pinned cryptographic hash or publisher signature. HTTPS protects the connection under normal circumstances, but it does not establish that the retrieved script is the exact artifact reviewed by the Skill auditor. Compromise of the upstream server, DNS or certificate trust infrastructure, or the remote distribution process could change the effective code executed by the installer. Bootstrapping `pip` may be necessary when a virtual environment lacks it, but direct remote execution is not the minimum-risk method required for video upscaling. The installer could instead require packaged `pip`, use Python's `ensurepip`, or verify a pinned bootstrap artifact before execution. ### Attack Path 1. The attacker compromises the upstream bootstrap service or another trusted part of the delivery chain. 2. The user runs `bash install.sh` on a system where the created virtual environment does not contain `pip`. 3. `curl` retrieves the attacker-controlled replacement for `get-pip.py`. 4. The shell pipes the response directly into Python without integrity verification. 5. The malicious Python payload executes with all privileges and filesystem access available to the user running the installer. 6. The payload can modify files, access credentials readable by that user, install further components, or alter the Skill environment. ### Impact Assessment The payload obtains arbitrary Python code execution with the installer's effective user p ...[truncated 398 chars]- Remediation
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