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Security audit

xeon-smartupscale_v2

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This appears to be a real video upscaler, but its installer runs or installs internet-downloaded code and binaries without integrity checks.

Review before installing. Do not run the installer with sudo, prefer installing pip and ffmpeg through trusted system package managers first, and use a disposable environment if possible. The skill does not look malicious from the artifacts, but the installer should be hardened with pinned versions and checksum or signature verification.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
else
    echo "Downloading static ffmpeg..."
    tmp="$(mktemp -d)"
    curl -sSL https://johnvansickle.com/ffmpeg/releases/ffmpeg-release-amd64-static.tar.xz -o "$tmp/ff.tar.xz"
    tar -xf "$tmp/ff.tar.xz" -C "$tmp/"
    cp "$tmp"/ffmpeg-*-amd64-static/ffmpeg "$DIR/bin/ffmpeg"
    cp "$tmp"/ffmpeg-*-amd64-static/ffprobe "$DIR/bin/ffprobe"
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The installer downloads a prebuilt ffmpeg archive from a third-party site and immediately extracts binaries for execution without any checksum, signature, or pinned-version verification. If the remote host, transport path, or artifact is compromised, users could install attacker-controlled executables that will later process untrusted media on the local machine.

External Script Fetching

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Content
if ! python -m pip --version &>/dev/null; then
  echo "Bootstrapping pip..."
  curl -sSL https://bootstrap.pypa.io/get-pip.py | python
fi

python -m pip install --upgrade pip >/dev/null
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The script fetches Python code from the network and pipes it directly into the interpreter, which is a classic remote code execution supply-chain pattern. Any compromise of the source, TLS trust chain, DNS resolution, or network path would allow arbitrary code to run during installation with the user's privileges.

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
if ! python -m pip --version &>/dev/null; then
  echo "Bootstrapping pip..."
  curl -sSL https://bootstrap.pypa.io/get-pip.py | python
fi

python -m pip install --upgrade pip >/dev/null
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The `| python` chain removes any opportunity to validate the fetched content before execution and turns a network retrieval into immediate code execution. In an installer context this is especially dangerous because it runs before trust is established and can alter the environment, install persistence, or tamper with later package installs.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.