ClawHub
Back to skill

Security audit

Session Handoff

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches its handoff purpose, but review is warranted because its documented installer uses mutable remote code and one resume check can inspect git metadata from a path supplied inside a handoff file.

Install only from a pinned, reviewed version or a trusted ClawHub distribution path. Treat handoff files as sensitive project records, review them before sharing or committing, and avoid running resume/staleness checks on handoffs from untrusted sources unless you verify the recorded project path first.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Findings (3)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error
Location
README.md:26
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party Installer and Mutable Repository Source

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/validate_handoff.py:22
Finding

Secret Validation Can Be Bypassed by Common Unquoted Credential Formats

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Note
Location
scripts/check_staleness.py:219
Finding

Untrusted Handoff Metadata Controls the Directory Used for Git Inspection

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Findings (12)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The documented purpose and the observed behavior are not tightly aligned: the skill description emphasizes creating and resuming handoff documents, while the workflow includes filesystem inspection, metadata extraction, and repository-state gathering. This mismatch can mislead users and reviewers about the real operational scope, causing them to authorize broader access than they intended.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/validate_handoff.py (reported line 34)May include surrounding context.

python
(r'postgres://[^/\s]+:[^@\s]+@', "PostgreSQL connection string with password"),
    (r'mysql://[^/\s]+:[^@\s]+@', "MySQL connection string with password"),
    (r'Bearer\s+[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]+', "Bearer token"),
    (r'ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36}', "GitHub personal access token"),
    (r'sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{48}', "OpenAI API key"),
    (r'xox[baprs]-[a-zA-Z0-9-]+', "Slack token"),
]

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill is explicitly designed to persist detailed session state so a fresh agent can resume with 'zero ambiguity'. Session persistence is inherently risky because handoff documents may contain sensitive data, internal reasoning summaries, credentials, tokens, file paths, or other context that outlives the original session and can be accessed later by unintended parties or agents.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
# Session Handoff

Create comprehensive handoff documents that enable fresh AI agents to seamlessly continue work with zero ambiguity. Solves the long-running agent context exhaustion problem.

## What's Inside

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The listed trigger phrases are broad, common conversational language such as 'continue where we left off' and 'save progress', which can cause the skill to activate in unintended contexts. In an agent environment, overbroad activation increases the chance that session data is captured, persisted, or reused when the user did not explicitly request that behavior.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to install directly from a remote GitHub source via npx add without any pinned version, tag, or commit. That creates a supply-chain risk because the referenced content can change over time, causing future installs to pull unexpected or malicious code.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

From your project root:

bash
mkdir -p .claude/skills
cp -r ~/.ai-skills/skills/tools/session-handoff .claude/skills/session-handoff

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

Claude Code (global)

bash
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills
cp -r ~/.ai-skills/skills/tools/session-handoff ~/.claude/skills/session-handoff

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to read and write files and execute shell commands, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. That creates an overbroad execution surface where a caller may trigger filesystem and shell activity without clear least-privilege constraints, increasing the risk of unintended file modification, data exposure, or command execution.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Model or Provider Selection

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: session-handoff
model: standard
description: |
  WHAT: Create comprehensive handoff documents that enable fresh AI agents to seamlessly continue work with zero ambiguity. Solves long-running agent context exhaustion problem.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The activation keywords include broad, common phrases such as 'save progress' and 'continue where we left off' that can occur in normal conversation. This raises the chance of accidental invocation, which is more dangerous here because the skill can trigger file operations and shell-based workflows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/check_staleness.py (reported line 28)May include surrounding context.

python
def run_cmd(cmd: list[str], cwd: str = None) -> tuple[bool, str]:
    """Run a command and return (success, output)."""
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            cmd,
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/create_handoff.py (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

python
def run_cmd(cmd: list[str], cwd: str = None) -> tuple[bool, str]:
    """Run a command and return (success, output)."""
    try:
        result = subprocess.run(
            cmd,
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.