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Security audit

Prometheus

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is mainly legitimate Prometheus guidance, but its install commands can run mutable remote code that was not part of the reviewed artifact.

Review the Prometheus templates before deploying, customize scrape targets and credential file paths, and avoid running the README's mutable `npx` install commands with elevated privileges. Prefer installing from a pinned, reviewed release or manually copying the reviewed artifact contents.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:30
Finding

Unpinned npm installer executes content from a mutable GitHub branch

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
\ https://github.com/wpank/ai/tree//skills/devops/prometheus ``` The placeholders must be replaced with versions and commits that have actually been reviewed and verified. ]]>

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
README.md:36
Finding

Installation command executes the mutable latest release of a third-party npm package

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
install prometheus ``` The version placeholder must be replaced with an exact release that has been independently reviewed and verified. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (7)

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 346)May include surrounding context.

md
| [templates/prometheus.yml](templates/prometheus.yml) | Full config with static, file-based, and K8s discovery |

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The installation command uses npx add against a GitHub URL without a pinned commit, tag, or package version, so the fetched code can change over time. This creates a supply-chain risk: anyone controlling that upstream reference or a compromised dependency path could cause users to install different code than was originally reviewed.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium
Category
MCP Rug Pull
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

npx clawhub@latest install prometheus explicitly tracks the latest version, which is mutable and may execute newly published code at install time. If the package publisher account or distribution pipeline is compromised, users could run attacker-controlled code simply by following the README.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 46)May include surrounding context.

From your project root:

bash
mkdir -p .cursor/skills
cp -r ~/.ai-skills/skills/devops/prometheus .cursor/skills/prometheus

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 62)May include surrounding context.

From your project root:

bash
mkdir -p .claude/skills
cp -r ~/.ai-skills/skills/devops/prometheus .claude/skills/prometheus

Skill Enumeration

Medium
Category
Agent Snooping
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 69)May include surrounding context.

Claude Code (global)

bash
mkdir -p ~/.claude/skills
cp -r ~/.ai-skills/skills/devops/prometheus ~/.claude/skills/prometheus

External Model or Provider Selection

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 3)May include surrounding context.

md
---
name: prometheus
model: fast
version: 1.0.0
description: >
  Prometheus monitoring — scrape configuration, service discovery, recording

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.