T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Warning
- Location
- README.md:7
- Finding
- Unpinned Remote Packages and Mutable Installation Sources## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `README.md`, lines 7-19 **Vulnerability Type**: Supply-chain risk from unpinned third-party installers and mutable remote sources **Risk Level**: Medium **Vulnerable Code Snippet**: ```markdown ## Installation Install into Claude Code or Cursor with: ```bash npx skills add https://github.com/wpank/Agentic-Uniswap/tree/main/.ai/skills/lp-strategy ``` Or via Clawhub: ```bash npx clawhub@latest install lp-strategy ``` ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented installation procedures invoke third-party packages through `npx` without fixed package versions, integrity hashes, or signature verification. The command using `clawhub@latest` explicitly resolves to a mutable package release. The alternative installation command retrieves content from the mutable Git `main` branch instead of a reviewed commit SHA. Consequently, the code and installation behavior executed by future users may differ from the version reviewed during this audit. Although the audited skill files contain no embedded executable payload, the documented installation process crosses a remote supply-chain trust boundary and may execute attacker-controlled package lifecycle or installer code if an upstream registry account, package, repository, maintainer account, or distribution channel is compromised. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `clawhub` or `skills` package, its publishing account, the referenced GitHub repository, or a relevant maintainer account. 2. The attacker publishes a malicious release selected by `@latest`, modifies installer behavior, or changes content on the referenced `main` branch. 3. A user follows the README and runs one of the documented `npx` installation commands. 4. `npx` downloads and executes the current remote package or installer without verifying it against a version or digest reviewed by the user. 5. The malicious installer executes with the privileges o ...[truncated 1042 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin every `npx` package to a specific, reviewed version rather than using an implicit version or `@latest`. 2. Replace the GitHub `main` branch reference with an immutable, reviewed commit SHA or signed release tag. 3. Publish expected integrity hashes or signatures and require users or installation tooling to verify downloaded artifacts before execution. 4. Use package-locking and registry integrity metadata where supported. 5. Document the files, commands, lifecycle scripts, network access, and permissions used by the installer. 6. Recommend installation from an unprivileged account and explicitly warn users not to run the commands with administrator or root privileges. 7. Review and pin transitive dependencies used by the installer, and establish a controlled process for updating those pins after security review.