Back to skill

Security audit

YouTube Chinese Subtitle Burn-in

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill mostly matches its YouTube subtitle purpose, but it can write raw user feedback into its own future instructions and repackage itself, which needs human review before installation.

Install only if you are comfortable with a YouTube media-processing skill that runs ffmpeg/yt-dlp and writes output files locally. Treat its feedback feature carefully: do not let untrusted users submit reusable feedback, and review any changes to workflow.md, quality-gates.md, or SKILL.md before re-packaging or reusing the skill.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Findings (1)

T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
scripts/record_feedback.py:48
Finding

Persistent Agent Instruction Poisoning Through Unsanitized Feedback

Content
View full analysis
int: parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="Record user subtitle feedback and optionally update reusable gates.") parser.add_argument("--issue", required=True) parser.add_argument("--category", required=True) parser.add_argument("--fix", required=True) parser.add_argument("--video", default="") parser.add_argument("--timestamp", default="") parser.add_argument("--cause", default="") parser.add_argument("--reusable", choices=["yes", "no"], default="yes") args = parser.parse_args() entry = f""" ### {date.today().isoformat()} - {args.category} - {args.issue} Date: {date.today().isoformat()} Video/output: {args.video or "not specified"} Timestamp: {args.timestamp or "not specified"} Category: {args.category} User issue: {args.issue} Confirmed cause: {args.cause or "to be confirmed during review"} Fix applied: {args.fix} Reusable: {args.reusable} SOP update: {"required" if args.reusable == "yes" else "not required"} Quality gate update: {"required" if args.reusable == "yes" else "not required"} """ append_under_heading(LEDGER, "## Entries", entry) print(f"Recorded feedback in {LEDGER}") if args.reusable == "yes": marker = f"Feedback gate: {args.category} - {args.issue}" gate = f"| {args.category}: {args.issue} | Same or similar user-visible subtitle problem appears during review | {args.fix} |" workflow = f""" ## Feedback Prevention: {args.category} When this pattern appears: {args.issue} Prevent it by: {args.fix} """ gate_changed = insert_before_heading_onc ...[truncated 4004 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
Findings (38)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to modify internal workflow, quality-gate, and feedback-ledger documentation based on user feedback and then re-package the skill. Allowing user-driven updates to the skill's own operational documents creates a prompt-injection and persistence risk: malicious user input could be written into trusted reference files and influence future runs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to modify internal workflow, quality-gate, and feedback-ledger documentation based on user feedback and then re-package the skill. Allowing user-driven updates to the skill's own operational documents creates a prompt-injection and persistence risk: malicious user input could be written into trusted reference files and influence future runs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to modify internal workflow, quality-gate, and feedback-ledger documentation based on user feedback and then re-package the skill. Allowing user-driven updates to the skill's own operational documents creates a prompt-injection and persistence risk: malicious user input could be written into trusted reference files and influence future runs.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unvalidated Output Injection

High
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Model output is used without validation or sanitization. Unvalidated output injected into downstream contexts (SQL, shell, HTML) enables injection attacks and arbitrary code execution.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/extract_design_frames.py (reported line 150)May include surrounding context.

python
args.out_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    for index, seconds in enumerate(times, 1):
        output = args.out_dir / format_name(index, seconds)
        result = subprocess.run(
            [
                "ffmpeg",
                "-y",

Unvalidated Output Injection

High
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Model output is used without validation or sanitization. Unvalidated output injected into downstream contexts (SQL, shell, HTML) enables injection attacks and arbitrary code execution.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/extract_review_frames.py (reported line 78)May include surrounding context.

python
args.out_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    for index, seconds in enumerate(times, 1):
        output = args.out_dir / format_name(index, seconds)
        result = subprocess.run(
            [
                "ffmpeg",
                "-y",

Unvalidated Output Injection

High
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Model output is used without validation or sanitization. Unvalidated output injected into downstream contexts (SQL, shell, HTML) enables injection attacks and arbitrary code execution.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/extract_source_subtitle_frames.py (reported line 58)May include surrounding context.

python
args.out_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    for index, seconds in enumerate(times, 1):
        output = args.out_dir / format_name(index, seconds)
        result = subprocess.run(
            [
                "ffmpeg",
                "-y",

Unvalidated Output Injection

High
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

Model output is used without validation or sanitization. Unvalidated output injected into downstream contexts (SQL, shell, HTML) enables injection attacks and arbitrary code execution.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/make_preview_clip.py (reported line 315)May include surrounding context.

python
draw_subtitles(image, current, style_profile)
        image.save(frame_path)

    encode = subprocess.run(
        [
            "ffmpeg",
            "-y",

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly relies on shell execution and file read/write operations, but it does not declare any tool scope or permission boundaries. That creates unnecessary privilege ambiguity: an agent could invoke broad local commands or modify files outside the intended workspace without policy-level restriction, especially because the workflow includes downloaders, media processors, and documentation updates.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The invocation text is broad enough to activate on many generic video-editing, translation, thumbnail, or review requests. Over-broad triggering can cause the agent to enter a shell/file/network-capable workflow in contexts where the user did not intend YouTube downloading, local file processing, or subtitle-burning operations, increasing the chance of unsafe tool use and overreach.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The overview states the skill will turn a YouTube video into a Simplified Chinese or optional bilingual output, making Chinese the default output language. This is a language-policy concern because the file sets a specific locale/language behavior by default rather than presenting it as a user choice or opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The instruction 'Default to Chinese-only unless the user asks for bilingual subtitles' hard-codes a language preference. Because the file does not frame this as a user-selected option, it can violate language/locale policy expectations around user choice.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/feedback-ledger.md (reported line 36)May include surrounding context.

md
| 2026-05-16 | cover | Add “中文字幕” and YouTube-style author information to the cover when requested | Cover translation needed a concrete output mode, not only a yes/no preference | yes | Add Cover Processing Mode with placement, preservation, versioned output, and visual check rules |
| 2026-05-16 | description | Video description should be downloaded and translated to Chinese when needed | Workflow retained video/subtitle/cover files but did not define description handling | yes | Extract original description, translate non-Chinese descriptions with the current agent model, and preserve proper nouns, URLs, and timestamps |
| 2026-05-16 | model portability | Skill should work with non-GPT agent models such as Minimax when the agent can run the local workflow | Translation instructions were worded around Codex/GPT as the default model | yes | Use current agent model wording and neutral translation-batch paths; keep old Codex batch script as a compatibility alias |
| 2026-05-16 | bilingual layout | Bilingual subtitles can become too tall or duplicate burned-in English subtitles | Chinese-only layout rules were reused without checking source subtitles or total subtitle height | yes | Add optional bilingual ASS generation, source subtitle check frames, and design confirmation frames before full burn |
| 2026-05-16 | bilingual layout | Bilingual subtitle video showed stray `N` characters and Chinese/English lines felt mismatched | ASS newline escaping leaked into visible text, and semantic Chinese screens were paired with fragmented rolling English captions | yes | Add visible newline artifact gate and require matched cue boundaries when semantic Chinese plus rolling English looks messy |
| 2026-05-16 | bilingual layout | Bilingual subtitles looked messier than Chinese-only | English was treated as an equally prominent second subtitle and exact matching could fragment the Chinese reading rhythm | yes | Default bilingual mode to Chinese-primary / English-auxiliary, smalle
...[truncated 25 chars]

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The gate requires retaining a Chinese translated description whenever the original description is not Chinese, which imposes a specific language outcome by default. The file also repeatedly centers Chinese-only or Chinese-primary output without stating that the user can choose another language, which conflicts with the policy against forcing a locale without opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The file requires that edited covers include the fixed Chinese label 中文字幕 and source attribution, which can cause the system to alter user assets by default once cover editing is requested. Even in a Chinese-subtitle skill, forcing specific overlay text without explicit per-edit confirmation can produce unwanted or misleading modifications, especially when the user asked only for subtitle generation or wanted the thumbnail preserved.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The template hard-codes a 'Chinese description' field and the checklist later requires retaining it when the original is not Chinese, which can normalize translation and transformation of third-party metadata without an explicit user request or documented justification. In a workflow that processes YouTube content, this increases the risk of unauthorized localization, policy drift, and delivery of modified metadata the user did not ask for.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The checklist requires every edited cover to include 中文字幕 regardless of whether the user asked for cover editing, requested preservation of original text, or authorized localization. In this skill context, that creates a strong workflow bias toward altering thumbnails and adding Chinese text to third-party artwork, which can misrepresent source media and cause unwanted or unauthorized content modification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The SOP says that if the user only provides a URL, the process should default to Simplified Chinese hard subtitles. This imposes a language/locale choice automatically rather than offering the user a choice or requiring explicit opt-in.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/burn_subtitles_pil.py (reported line 95)May include surrounding context.

python
def probe(video: Path) -> tuple[int, int, float]:
    result = subprocess.run(
        [
            "ffprobe",
            "-v",

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/burn_subtitles_pil.py (reported line 277)May include surrounding context.

python
frame_size = width * height * 3
    args.out.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)

    decoder = subprocess.Popen(
        ["ffmpeg", "-v", "error", *ffmpeg_input_args(args.video, args.start, args.duration), "-f", "rawvideo", "-pix_fmt", "rgb24", "-"],
        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
    )

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/burn_subtitles_pil.py (reported line 281)May include surrounding context.

python
["ffmpeg", "-v", "error", *ffmpeg_input_args(args.video, args.start, args.duration), "-f", "rawvideo", "-pix_fmt", "rgb24", "-"],
        stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
    )
    encoder = subprocess.Popen(
        [
            "ffmpeg",
            "-y",

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/check_ffmpeg_subtitle_support.py (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

python
def has_filter(ffmpeg: str, name: str) -> bool:
    result = subprocess.run([ffmpeg, "-hide_banner", "-filters"], check=False, text=True, capture_output=True)
    return result.returncode == 0 and re.search(rf"\b{name}\b", result.stdout) is not None

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The script embeds Chinese-specific punctuation and phrase rules and treats only styles prefixed with "Chinese" and "English" as the bilingual model, which imposes a specific language/locale policy in natural-language logic. There is no opt-in, language selection, or documented justification that this checker is intentionally limited to Chinese/English subtitle workflows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/download_youtube_thumbnail.py (reported line 33)May include surrounding context.

python
output_template,
        args.url,
    ]
    result = subprocess.run(command, text=True, capture_output=True, check=False)
    if result.returncode != 0:
        print(result.stdout, end="")
        print(result.stderr, end="")

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/extract_review_frames.py (reported line 24)May include surrounding context.

python
def get_duration(video: Path) -> float:
    result = subprocess.run(
        [
            "ffprobe",
            "-v",

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/extract_source_subtitle_frames.py (reported line 12)May include surrounding context.

python
def get_duration(video: Path) -> float:
    result = subprocess.run(
        ["ffprobe", "-v", "error", "-print_format", "json", "-show_format", str(video)],
        check=False,
        text=True,