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Security audit

YouTube Chinese Subtitle Burn-in

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed YouTube subtitle and video-processing skill that uses expected media tools and project files, with no evidence of hidden data access or destructive behavior.

Install this only if you want an agent to download/process YouTube media, run ffmpeg/yt-dlp, and create local subtitle/video outputs. Check that you have rights to transform the source video, specify Chinese-only versus bilingual output up front, and review any proposed reusable feedback updates before repackaging the skill.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Findings (4)

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
print(f"Window: start={start:.3f}s duration={duration:.3f}s subtitle_cues={len(selected)}")
            print(f"Render mode: {mode}")
            return 0
        result = subprocess.run(
            [
                "ffmpeg",
                "-y",
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding
result = subprocess.run( [ "ffmpeg", "-y", "-ss", f"{start:.3f}", "-t", f"{duration:

Lp3

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill directs the agent to read and write many project files and invoke shell tools like ffmpeg, yt-dlp, and Python scripts, but it does not declare corresponding permissions. That creates a capability/permission mismatch where operators or policy layers may underestimate what the skill can do, reducing transparency and weakening review and containment.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The invocation description is broad enough to match many generic requests about subtitles, translation, thumbnails, descriptions, and feedback handling, not just the narrowly intended YouTube burn-in workflow. Over-broad routing can activate a shell-capable, file-writing skill in contexts where a simpler, lower-privilege skill would suffice, increasing the chance of unnecessary downloads, file modification, or processing of untrusted inputs.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The workflow explicitly defaults to producing Simplified Chinese hard-subtitled output for any user who provides only a URL, without first obtaining clear consent for translation, subtitle language, or media modification. This can cause unauthorized transformation of third-party content, user surprise, and accidental disclosure or publication of altered outputs that the user did not intend to create.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.