T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:72- Finding
Execution of Unpinned Code from a Remote Git Repository
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 72–74
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval and execution
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Code:
bash uvx --from git+https://github.com/wodenwang/feishu-extension-skills.git feishu-extension-skills invoke <action> --args-json '<json>'Technical Analysis
The documented command instructs the agent to use
uvxto retrieve and execute a package directly from a remote Git repository. The repository reference is not pinned to a reviewed commit hash or another immutable revision.Consequently, the code executed when the command is invoked can differ from the code that existed when this skill was reviewed. Control of the effective execution payload remains with the upstream repository. Although the repository URL is consistent with the homepage declared by the skill and there is no evidence that it is currently malicious, this design crosses a remote code-execution trust boundary without ensuring payload immutability or integrity.
This issue is best classified as remote payload retrieval and execution rather than an embedded malicious-code issue because the executable implementation is not included in the audited project.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream repository, a maintainer account, or its dependency publication workflow.
- The attacker modifies the repository's default branch to include malicious package initialization or command-handling code.
- A user or agent follows the documented command without specifying a trusted commit.
uvxretrieves the attacker-controlled revision and executes it locally.- The payload runs with the privileges and environment of the invoking process, potentially gaining access to Feishu credentials and other locally accessible resources.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation can result in arbitrary code execution under the invoking user's operating-syst ...[truncated 566 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the Git dependency to a reviewed, immutable commit hash instead of using the repository's mutable default branch.
- Prefer a signed, versioned release from a trusted package registry with integrity hashes or lockfile verification.
- Verify the source and dependency tree of the pinned revision before approving it for agent execution.
- Execute the CLI in a restricted environment with minimal filesystem, network, and process privileges.
- Prevent the remotely retrieved process from receiving credentials unless they are strictly required for the selected operation.
- Establish an update process in which new revisions are reviewed and explicitly approved before the pin is changed.
