Back to skill

Security audit

Global Business AI Assistant

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent WLdPass commerce API skill, but it needs review because it handles account tokens insecurely and enables broad automated business actions and webhook data flows.

Install only if you trust WLdPass with your business account data and agent-driven commerce actions. Prefer setting WLDPASS_API_TOKEN through a safer secret mechanism, avoid passing real tokens on the command line, check permissions on ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json, and require manual approval for messages, demand publishing, community posts, auto-replies, batch actions, and webhook registration.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (2)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/setup.py:63
Finding

API Token Exposed Through Command-Line Arguments

Content
View full analysis
[--webhook ]") print(" Get your token at https://wldpass.com/center\n") sys.exit(1) ``` The documented setup commands similarly instruct users to supply the bearer token directly: ```bash python3 {baseDir}/scripts/setup.py wldpass_YOUR_TOKEN python3 {baseDir}/scripts/setup.py wldpass_YOUR_TOKEN --webhook https://your-server.com/webhook ``` ### Technical Analysis The setup utility accepts `WLDPASS_API_TOKEN` as a positional command-line argument. Command-line secrets can be retained in interactive shell history and may be visible temporarily through process-inspection facilities, depending on the operating system and its process-access controls. The token authorizes access to WLdPass account and commerce APIs. Although transmitting it to the declared first-party HTTPS service is necessary for token verification, placing it in `argv` is not necessary. A secret environment variable, masked prompt, or credential store would avoid this exposure. This behavior violates secure secret-handling practices and exceeds the minimum exposure needed for the Skill's declared setup functionality. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows the documented setup ...[truncated 1094 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/setup.py:43
Finding

Bearer Token Stored Unencrypted Without Permission Enforcement

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (8)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

md
env:
        - WLDPASS_API_TOKEN
      bins:
        - curl
      anyBins:
        - python3
        - python

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly instructs users to submit email/password credentials and bearer tokens to a third-party service, but it does not clearly warn that sensitive credentials, profile data, business details, and messages will leave the local environment. This creates a real risk of unintended credential disclosure or unsafe use by agents that may automatically execute documented actions without adequate user consent or data-handling awareness.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

This authenticated API call transmits a bearer token and retrieves profile, bot, and showcase information from an external service. In the context of an agent skill, external transmission is expected, but it is still security-relevant because it exposes sensitive account data to a third party and should be clearly disclosed and constrained.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 73)May include surrounding context.

2. get_profile — Get my full profile

bash
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $WLDPASS_API_TOKEN" \
  https://wldpass.com/api/v1/openclaw/me

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 200)May include surrounding context.

12. round2_demands — Round 2 open bidding list

bash
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $WLDPASS_API_TOKEN" \
  "https://wldpass.com/api/v1/openclaw/match/round2-demands?keyword=CNC&page=1"

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The webhook and scheduled delivery sections describe automatic pushing of messages, match activity, contact unlocks, and digest data to external endpoints, but they do not prominently warn that account activity will be continuously exfiltrated to a remote URL once enabled. Even with some SSRF protections, this is still a data-flow risk because sensitive operational metadata may be sent off-platform or to misconfigured destinations.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 374)May include surrounding context.

28. intelligence_keyword — Keyword competition analysis

bash
curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $WLDPASS_API_TOKEN" \
  "https://wldpass.com/api/v1/openclaw/intelligence/keyword?keyword=CNC%20machining"

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

This function performs an HTTP POST to wldpass.com to register a webhook endpoint, which is a network operation that transmits user-provided configuration to a third party. While the script prints that it is registering a webhook, it does not clearly warn the user beforehand that the URL will be sent to the external WLdPass API and later used for outbound hourly digest delivery.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

The docstring frames the setup as local and reviewable within the package, yet the script verifies tokens against wldpass.com and can register a webhook via remote POST requests. That is an intent-level mismatch in the inline documentation because the behavior is not confined to local reviewable steps.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.