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Security audit

huawei-cloud-dns-list

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan marks this skill suspicious because a confirmed finding says environment settings can select a program to run with the agent’s privileges, while some referenced paths were not resolved and the scan is partial.

Treat this as a review-required install. Before installing, check whether untrusted launchers or configuration can influence the DNS_LIST_HCLOUD_BIN or DNS_LIST_HCLOUD_ARGS environment settings, and confirm what permissions the host grants the skill. Skillspector inspected all nine listed components, but marked its analysis partial because several local path-like references did not resolve; the evidence is therefore incomplete. A separate AIG scan completed with no findings, which does not resolve the confirmed TT2 concern.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (5)

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, file_read, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Acceptance criteria mandate Chinese-language output without a documented language choice or locale justification.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The criteria require Chinese table headers and specific Chinese messages for empty results and permission errors. Line 27 also requires a Chinese file-write error message, but the file provides no user opt-in, language selection, or justification for fixing these outputs to Chinese.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_dns.py (reported line 302)May include surrounding context.

python
cmd.extend(extra)
    cmd.extend(argv)
    try:
        proc = subprocess.run(
            cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
            timeout=120, universal_newlines=True,
        )

Tainted flow: 'cmd' from os.environ.get (line 296, credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

DNS_LIST_HCLOUD_BIN selects an arbitrary executable and DNS_LIST_HCLOUD_ARGS supplies unchecked arguments outside the operation guard. If a lower-trust launcher or execution configuration can influence the inherited environment, these test hooks permit code execution with the agent's privileges and access to inherited cloud credentials; this is not shell injection and requires that environment-control precondition.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_dns.py (reported line 302)May include surrounding context.

python
cmd.extend(extra)
    cmd.extend(argv)
    try:
        proc = subprocess.run(
            cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
            timeout=120, universal_newlines=True,
        )

Markdown export is silently skipped when --output is combined with --json or --names-only.

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes --output as writing the current table view, and L018–L021 explicitly document that export is additional to the stdout modes. However, both --json and --names-only return successfully at L859 and L866 before export is processed, so these combinations create no Markdown file and provide no warning.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.