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Security audit

huawei-cloud-cc-list

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The cloud listing function is appropriately limited, but its installation guide runs a downloaded script whose publisher provenance is unclear.

Install KooCLI through Huawei's official instructions instead of running the bundled download command until its source is verified. Use credentials limited to cloud connection listing, configure them outside chat, and keep executable overrides under your control. The SDK fallback directly reads credential variables. Offline checks passed 52 tests; five SDK-dependent tests were skipped.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (5)

Env Variable Harvesting

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code enumerates, copies, or searches environment variables for secrets. Bulk environment access can collect credentials unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_cc.py (reported line 330)May include surrounding context.

python
)

    def _env_credential(markers):
        for key, value in os.environ.items():
            upper = key.upper()
            if not upper.startswith(("HUAWEI", "HW_", "HWC")):
                continue

Env Variable Harvesting

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code enumerates, copies, or searches environment variables for secrets. Bulk environment access can collect credentials unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.

Content

Scanner excerpt · tests/test_list_cc.py (reported line 364)May include surrounding context.

python
def _clean_credential_env(self):
        return {
            key: value for key, value in os.environ.items()
            if not key.upper().startswith(("HUAWEI", "HW_", "HWC"))
        }

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: env, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_cc.py (reported line 216)May include surrounding context.

python
cmd.extend(extra)
    cmd.extend(argv)
    try:
        proc = subprocess.run(
            cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
            timeout=120, universal_newlines=True,
        )

Tainted flow: 'cmd' from os.environ.get (line 210, credential/environment) → subprocess.run (code execution)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/list_cc.py (reported line 216)May include surrounding context.

python
cmd.extend(extra)
    cmd.extend(argv)
    try:
        proc = subprocess.run(
            cmd, stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE,
            timeout=120, universal_newlines=True,
        )

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.