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Security audit

Polymarket Sniper Bot (Standalone)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a real-money autonomous trading skill with several unsafe controls and documentation mismatches that users should review before installing.

Review this skill carefully before installing. Use only a burner wallet with limited funds, keep live trading disabled until you verify the actual code path, remove the fabricated momentum fallback, bind the dashboard to localhost or add authentication, pin dependencies in a virtual environment, and do not set PRO_LICENSE_KEY or LICENSE_SERVER unless you trust and understand the license validation service.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (5)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/polymarket.py:146
Finding

Fabricated Momentum Data Can Trigger Live Financial Trades

Content
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= 3: p_now = float(prices[-1].get('price', 0)) p_old = float(prices[-3].get('price', 0)) if p_old > 0: momentum = (p_now - p_old) / p_old log_event("DEBUG", "STRATEGY", f"Market {market_id}: Price now {p_now}, 3p ago {p_old}, Mom {momentum:.4f}") return momentum # DEMO FALLBACK: If real data isn't available for this market, we mock a 3% gain # to show the user the order logic triggering. log_event("DEBUG", "DEMO", f"Mocking 3% momentum for demo: Market {market_id}") return 0.03 except Exception as e: log_event("ERROR", "STRATEGY", f"Momentum calc failed: {str(e)}") return 0.0 ``` ```python def execute_scan(): log_event("INFO", "SCAN", "Starting momentum scan loop...") markets = scan_markets() for market in markets: m_id = market.get('id') mom = calculate_momentum(m_id) if mom > 0.02: place_order(m_id, "YES") elif mom < -0.02: place_order(m_id, "NO") log_event("INFO", "SCAN", f"Scan finished. Analyzed {len(markets)} markets.") ``` ### Technical Analysis When the price-history API does not prov ...[truncated 2152 chars]
Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
scripts/polymarket.py:15
Finding

Undocumented Network License Response Controls Live Trading

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/polymarket.py:16
Finding

License Credential Can Be Transmitted to an Arbitrary Plaintext Endpoint

Content
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Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/dashboard.py:13
Finding

Unauthenticated Trading Dashboard Is Exposed on All Network Interfaces

Content
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Remediation
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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
scripts/scripts/bootstrap.sh:15
Finding

Unpinned Dependencies Are Installed into the System Python Environment

Content
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Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Findings (32)

Tainted flow: 'LICENSE_SERVER' from os.getenv (line 16, credential/environment) → requests.post (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The code sends the PRO license key to a URL fully controlled by the LICENSE_SERVER environment variable, defaulting to insecure HTTP. An attacker who can influence environment variables or local network routing can exfiltrate the key or redirect validation traffic to an attacker-controlled host, and the lack of TLS enables interception or tampering.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/polymarket.py (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

python
if not PRO_LICENSE_KEY:
        return False
    try:
        resp = requests.post(
            f"{LICENSE_SERVER}/api/validate",
            json={"key": PRO_LICENSE_KEY, "product": "polymarket-sniper-pro"},
            timeout=5

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

Yes, this is a mismatch. The declared description presents a fully functional autonomous trading system, but the provided code chunk has no substantive behavior at all—only an empty package initializer. There are no implemented capabilities related to market access, momentum analysis, trade execution, simulation, dashboards, triggers, or external resource usage. This is a materially different actual behavior from the declared purpose.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises and likely exercises sensitive capabilities such as environment access, file reads, and network access, but does not declare any explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. In an autonomous trading context, this makes it harder for users or a hosting platform to understand and constrain what the agent can access, increasing the risk of secret exposure, unintended outbound requests, or unsafe execution paths.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill promotes autonomous live trading and a one-command bootstrap flow without prominent warnings about financial loss, real-money execution, key handling, or the consequences of enabling live mode. In this context, missing risk disclosure is dangerous because users may move from setup to live execution without understanding that the agent can place actual trades and incur immediate financial harm.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The description explicitly states that the agent 'scans ... and executes trades automatically' but provides no indication of user approval gates, disabling controls, or bounded execution conditions. In a trading context, broad autonomous-execution language increases the risk that the skill is deployed or interpreted as authorized to place real-money trades without explicit, ongoing user consent.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The natural-language metadata presents autonomous trading as a default behavior and does not mention user opt-in, supervision, or control mechanisms. Because this skill targets Polymarket on Polygon and is framed as a live trading bot, the lack of consent and control language materially raises the chance of unsafe real-fund execution, misconfiguration, or unauthorized trading activity.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The README presents the project as an autonomous trading agent that scans markets and executes trades, but it does not warn users that live order placement can cause immediate financial loss or unintended trades. In a trading skill, omitting clear risk and live-execution disclosures increases the chance that a user will run the system assuming it is informational or simulated when it may place real orders.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The Quick Start tells users to execute the bootstrap script and launch the dashboard immediately, without any warning that setup may configure a live trading environment or that subsequent use could result in real market activity. Because this is an autonomous trading bot, terse execution instructions materially increase the risk of unsafe deployment before users understand configuration, credentials, or trading mode.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The manifest schedules an autonomous trading task that performs scans and executes trades every 5 minutes, but the YAML provides no explicit user-facing disclosure, confirmation gate, or risk warning that real market orders may be placed. In a trading skill, undisclosed live execution can cause financial loss if a user installs or enables the agent without fully understanding that it will trade automatically on a recurring schedule.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

This is an external transmission of a license credential to a remote endpoint. In context, it is dangerous because the destination is environment-controlled and not restricted to secure transport, creating unnecessary exposure of a secret.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/polymarket.py (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

python
if not PRO_LICENSE_KEY:
        return False
    try:
        resp = requests.post(
            f"{LICENSE_SERVER}/api/validate",
            json={"key": PRO_LICENSE_KEY, "product": "polymarket-sniper-pro"},
            timeout=5

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill transmits a license key to a remote service without an explicit user-facing warning in this file, and does so automatically at startup. In a security-sensitive agent context, silent outbound transmission of credentials/secrets increases privacy and trust risk, especially because the destination is configurable and defaults to plain HTTP.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

Runtime messages are sent to an arbitrary Discord webhook from configuration, which can leak trading activity, balances, market IDs, and operational status to third parties. In an autonomous trading bot, that telemetry can expose sensitive financial behavior and create an exfiltration channel if the config is altered.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

This sends alert content to an externally supplied webhook URL with no validation or disclosure. In context, alert messages may contain operational and financial information, so this creates a configurable exfiltration path.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/polymarket.py (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

python
webhook = config.get("discord_webhook")
    if webhook:
        try:
            requests.post(webhook, json={"content": msg})
        except:
            pass
    print(f"Alert: {msg}")

Tainted flow: 'headers' from requests.get (line 236, network input) → requests.get (network output)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/polymarket.py (reported line 155)May include surrounding context.

python
path = f"/prices/history?market={market_id}&interval=15m&start={start}&end={end}"
        headers = get_api_headers("GET", path)
        res = requests.get(f"{CLOB_API}{path}", headers=headers)
        
        if res.status_code == 200:
            prices = res.json()

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

When price history is unavailable, the bot fabricates a +3% momentum signal, which can deterministically trigger BUY orders once live mode is enabled. In an autonomous trading skill, falsifying market signals is dangerous because data outages or API failures can directly cause unauthorized or irrational real-money trades.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The bot can place real live trades automatically without an explicit confirmation gate at the point of execution. Given the autonomous context and the presence of fabricated momentum fallback logic elsewhere, the absence of a strong execution safeguard materially increases the chance of unintended financial loss.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/polymarket.py (reported line 242)May include surrounding context.

python
return

        # Submit order to CLOB
        res = requests.post(f"{CLOB_API}/orders", json=order_payload, headers=headers, timeout=10)
        if res.status_code in (200, 201):
            result = res.json()
            tx_hash = result.get('orderID') or result.get('id') or 'unknown'

Tainted flow: 'order_payload' from requests.get (line 229, network input) → requests.post (network output)

Medium
Category
Data Flow
Confidence
65% confidence
Finding

Data from a source is assigned to a variable that is later passed to a sink, creating a variable-mediated taint flow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/polymarket.py (reported line 242)May include surrounding context.

python
return

        # Submit order to CLOB
        res = requests.post(f"{CLOB_API}/orders", json=order_payload, headers=headers, timeout=10)
        if res.status_code in (200, 201):
            result = res.json()
            tx_hash = result.get('orderID') or result.get('id') or 'unknown'

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The script installs dependencies with pip3 using --break-system-packages, which intentionally bypasses Python environment protections and modifies the system interpreter without prompting the user. In an autonomous trading bot context, this increases operational risk because dependency installation may destabilize the host, overwrite distro-managed packages, or make later security patching and auditing harder.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

The instruction says to deploy the bot on a Linux server, which imposes a platform constraint in natural language. The file does not indicate that this is optional, nor does it explain why Linux is required, so it may conflict with the policy against forcing a specific environment without opt-in or justification.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
78% confidence
Finding

The log_event function writes arbitrary event messages into a local database table, creating persistent records that may include operational or user-derived information. There is no confirmation, print/log disclosure to the user, or inline documentation warning that log data is stored.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
82% confidence
Finding

This code writes position records to a local SQLite database, which affects persisted user or system data. The function contains no confirmation prompt or user-facing disclosure, and this file itself does not document that the operation stores trading-related data.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes a Polymarket trading agent with dashboard, simulation mode, and live execution, but this file also contacts a separate license server and gates live trading on commercial license validation. That monetization/control-plane behavior is not an obvious implementation detail of market scanning or order execution and is absent from the stated skill description.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Unpinned Dependencies

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The dependency list leaves requests unpinned, so installations may resolve to different versions over time, including vulnerable or breaking releases. In an autonomous trading agent, nondeterministic dependency resolution increases supply-chain risk and can expose network-facing code to known library flaws.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/requirements.txt (reported line 1)May include surrounding context.

text
requests
pyyaml
flask
web3

Unverifiable Dependency: requests has 16 known advisory(ies) (CVE-2014-1830 (Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor in Requests); CVE-2024-47081 (Requests vulnerable to .netrc credentials leak via malicious URLs); CVE-2024-35195 (Requests `Session` object does not verify requests after making first request wi) +13 more), but the manifest does not pin a version, so it is unknown whether the installed release is affected

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

requests has multiple known advisories, and because no version is pinned, there is no way to verify whether deployments avoid affected releases. For a network-connected autonomous agent, this uncertainty is dangerous because HTTP handling may touch APIs, credentials, and remote content continuously.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.