T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
install.sh:39- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Installed from the Default Package Index
- Content
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/dev/null; then echo -e "${GREEN}✅ aiohttp 已安装${NC}" else echo -e "${YELLOW}⚠️ aiohttp 未安装,正在安装...${NC}" pip3 install aiohttp python-dotenv --quiet echo -e "${GREEN}✅ aiohttp 安装完成${NC}" fi if python3 -c "import dotenv" 2>/dev/null; then echo -e "${GREEN}✅ python-dotenv 已安装${NC}" else echo -e "${YELLOW}⚠️ python-dotenv 未安装,正在安装...${NC}" pip3 install python-dotenv --quiet echo -e "${GREEN}✅ python-dotenv 安装完成${NC}" fi ``` The skill metadata also declares mutable package requirements: ```yaml install: - id: pip kind: pip packages: ["aiohttp", "python-dotenv"] label: "安装Python依赖 (pip)" ``` ### Technical Analysis The installer requests `aiohttp` and `python-dotenv` without version constraints or package hashes. Consequently, the code installed depends on whichever package versions and transitive dependencies the configured package index resolves at installation time. Python package installation may process wheels, source distributions, build-system dependencies, and package metadata. If a package release, transitive dependency, package index, or package maintainer account is compromised, the installer can retrieve and process code that was not part of the audited skill. The absence of a lock file and integrity hashes also prevents reproducible verification of the installed dependency set. The package names appear legitimate, and the audit found no evidence that the current project intentionally references a typosquatted or malicious package. The risk arises from mutable, unverifiable dependency resolution. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a dependency release, maintainer account, transitive dependency, or package distribution channel. 2. Th ...[truncated 1100 chars]- Remediation
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