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Security audit

Standx Cli

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed StandX crypto-trading helper, but it needs Review because it installs an unverified trading binary with elevated privileges and gives risky plaintext credential-handling guidance.

Install only if you trust the StandX CLI publisher and are comfortable with a tool that can access account data and place real trades. Prefer Homebrew or a verified release path, avoid the direct sudo curl/tar installer unless you can verify the binary, keep the private key out of shell startup files, never print tokens or private keys into logs, and require explicit confirmation before any order, cancel-all, leverage, or margin command.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
SKILL.md:27
Finding

Unverified External Trading Binary Is Downloaded and Installed

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:36
Finding

Predictable Shared Temporary Paths Are Used Before Privileged Installation

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
references/troubleshooting.md:43
Finding

Troubleshooting Instructions Expose Trading Credentials and Encourage Broad Environment Forwarding

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Findings (49)

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The script chains network download, extraction, and privileged installation into a single command sequence. This reduces opportunities for review or integrity checking between steps, so if any upstream component is malicious or replaced, the chain streamlines system-wide compromise via sudo.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 36)May include surrounding context.

md
{
              "id": "github-linux",
              "kind": "script",
              "script": "curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz && tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp && sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ && sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx",
              "bins": ["standx"],
              "label": "Install StandX CLI on Linux",
            },

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The macOS one-liner has the same chaining problem: remote artifact retrieval and root-assisted installation are combined without pause for provenance validation. In practice, chained install flows are more dangerous in agent-facing skills because they encourage automatic execution with reduced user scrutiny.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

md
{
              "id": "github-macos",
              "kind": "script",
              "script": "curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz && tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp && sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ && sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx",
              "bins": ["standx"],
              "label": "Install StandX CLI on macOS",
            },

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The chained install command combines download, extraction, and privileged installation in a single && sequence, reducing opportunities for users or tooling to inspect intermediate artifacts before sudo is invoked. This pattern amplifies supply-chain risk because any compromise in the earlier network step flows directly into privileged execution and persistence.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw/SKILL.md (reported line 36)May include surrounding context.

md
{
              "id": "github-linux",
              "kind": "script",
              "script": "curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz && tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp && sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ && sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx",
              "bins": ["standx"],
              "label": "Install StandX CLI on Linux",
            },

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The macOS chained installer has the same issue: it pipelines remote download and extraction directly into privileged installation with minimal friction. In an agent or copy-paste execution context, this makes it easier to execute a dangerous sequence without review or validation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw/SKILL.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

md
{
              "id": "github-macos",
              "kind": "script",
              "script": "curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz && tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp && sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ && sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx",
              "bins": ["standx"],
              "label": "Install StandX CLI on macOS",
            },

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The Linux command chains download, extraction, and privileged installation into one uninterrupted shell expression. This makes review and safe failure handling harder, and in practice encourages users or agents to run a complex remote-install pipeline as a single action, increasing the blast radius if any earlier step is subverted.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw/skill.json (reported line 30)May include surrounding context.

json
{
        "id": "github-linux",
        "kind": "script",
        "script": "curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz && tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp && sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ && sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx",
        "bins": ["standx"],
        "label": "Install StandX CLI on Linux"
      },

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The macOS install command similarly chains network retrieval, unpacking, and sudo-based placement into a single command line. In the context of a finance-related CLI that may later handle exchange credentials and signing keys, this pattern materially raises the danger of installing a trojanized binary with little opportunity for user inspection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw/skill.json (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

json
{
        "id": "github-macos",
        "kind": "script",
        "script": "curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz && tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp && sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ && sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx",
        "bins": ["standx"],
        "label": "Install StandX CLI on macOS"
      }

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/troubleshooting.md (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

Solution:

  1. Clear history immediately:
    bash
    history -d $(history 1)
# or clear all

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The chained command combines download, extraction, and privileged installation in a single flow, reducing opportunities for inspection and increasing the blast radius of any compromise in earlier steps. In a financial-trading tool context, this is more dangerous because the installed binary may later access valuable credentials and initiate trades.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.json (reported line 32)May include surrounding context.

json
{
        "id": "github-linux",
        "kind": "script",
        "script": "curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz && tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp && sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ && sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx",
        "bins": ["standx"],
        "label": "Install StandX CLI on Linux"
      },

Chaining Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The macOS one-liner similarly chains untrusted network retrieval directly into privileged installation, which obscures review and encourages unsafe operator behavior. Because this skill is for exchange access and trading, compromise of the installed CLI could expose JWTs, private keys, account data, or execute unauthorized orders.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skill.json (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

json
{
        "id": "github-macos",
        "kind": "script",
        "script": "curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz && tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp && sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ && sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx",
        "bins": ["standx"],
        "label": "Install StandX CLI on macOS"
      },

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The install script downloads an archive from the internet and then performs privileged file moves and permission changes with sudo in a single scripted flow. This increases risk because a compromised release artifact or tampered download path could lead to installing an untrusted executable into a system-wide location with elevated privileges.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 36)May include surrounding context.

md
{
              "id": "github-linux",
              "kind": "script",
              "script": "curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz && tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp && sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ && sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx",
              "bins": ["standx"],
              "label": "Install StandX CLI on Linux",
            },

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

This macOS install script similarly downloads a remote binary and then uses sudo to place it into /usr/local/bin. If the downloaded artifact or release source is compromised, the user is encouraged to elevate and trust that binary system-wide without an integrity-verification step.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

md
{
              "id": "github-macos",
              "kind": "script",
              "script": "curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz && tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp && sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ && sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx",
              "bins": ["standx"],
              "label": "Install StandX CLI on macOS",
            },

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The direct-download installation instructions normalize use of sudo for moving a freshly downloaded binary into a privileged path. While common operationally, it is still security-relevant because it trains users to grant elevated privileges to unverified downloaded code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

md
# Linux x86_64
curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz
tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp
sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/
sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx

# macOS Apple Silicon

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The chmod operation is part of the same privileged install path and therefore contributes to execution-enabling a remotely downloaded binary with root-assisted placement. The danger is not chmod alone, but the overall elevation flow applied to code obtained over the network without verification.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 85)May include surrounding context.

md
curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz
tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp
sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/
sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx

# macOS Apple Silicon
curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This repeats the same pattern for the macOS direct-download path: a downloaded archive is extracted and installed with sudo into a trusted executable path. In a skill file, such copy-pastable commands may be executed by users or agents with little scrutiny, increasing practical risk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 90)May include surrounding context.

macOS Apple Silicon

curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx

text

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This privileged chmod line completes the installation of a remotely downloaded binary into a system path, making it readily executable. The security concern is the end-to-end elevation and trust of an unverified artifact, not merely the permission command in isolation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 91)May include surrounding context.

curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx

text

### Option 4: Manual Install (Skill Only)

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Advising users to place a JWT token and private key in ~/.bashrc or ~/.zshrc creates long-lived secret persistence in plaintext shell startup files. Those files are often backed up, synced, inspected by other tools, or accidentally exposed, which increases the blast radius of credential compromise for a trading account.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 128)May include surrounding context.

The most secure way to authenticate. Credentials are not stored in shell history or command logs.

bash
# Add to ~/.bashrc or ~/.zshrc
export STANDX_JWT="your_jwt_token"
export STANDX_PRIVATE_KEY="your_ed25519_private_key"

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill documents live trading, leverage, margin, and cancellation commands without prominent warnings that these actions can place real orders, alter account risk, or cause irreversible financial loss. In an agent-skill context, users may rely on the documentation operationally, so omission of explicit safety guardrails increases the chance of unintended account-impacting actions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises a very broad activation scope for market data, trading, account access, and leverage management without tight trigger constraints or exclusions. In an agent setting, this increases the chance the skill is invoked for ambiguous financial requests and can lead to unintended high-stakes actions using authenticated credentials.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

The install script downloads an archive from the network and then, in the same chain, moves the extracted binary into /usr/local/bin with sudo. If the downloaded artifact is malicious, tampered with, or replaced upstream, the skill encourages privileged installation of an unverified executable, raising the impact to system compromise.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw/SKILL.md (reported line 36)May include surrounding context.

md
{
              "id": "github-linux",
              "kind": "script",
              "script": "curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz && tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp && sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ && sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx",
              "bins": ["standx"],
              "label": "Install StandX CLI on Linux",
            },

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

This macOS install script mirrors the same pattern of downloading from the network and then using sudo to place an unverified binary into a privileged path. The primary danger is not sudo alone, but combining elevated privileges with an unauthenticated or unverified software supply-chain step.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw/SKILL.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.

md
{
              "id": "github-macos",
              "kind": "script",
              "script": "curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz && tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp && sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ && sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx",
              "bins": ["standx"],
              "label": "Install StandX CLI on macOS",
            },

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

The documentation instructs users to use sudo to move a downloaded binary into /usr/local/bin. In context, this is a common install pattern, but it still creates elevated-risk guidance because a compromised download would be granted persistence and broad execution access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw/SKILL.md (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

md
# Linux x86_64
curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz
tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp
sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/
sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx

# macOS Apple Silicon

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

Using sudo chmod on the installed binary is a privileged action, but on its own it is less dangerous than the preceding privileged move of an unverified binary. The risk is mostly contextual because it is part of the same manual installation flow that grants trust and execution to downloaded code.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw/SKILL.md (reported line 78)May include surrounding context.

md
curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu.tar.gz
tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp
sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/
sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx

# macOS Apple Silicon
curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding

This repeats the privileged move pattern for the macOS manual install path, again promoting installation of a network-downloaded binary with sudo. In a security review, repeated unsafe installation guidance increases exposure across platforms and environments.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw/SKILL.md (reported line 83)May include surrounding context.

macOS Apple Silicon

curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx

text

Sudo/Root Execution

Medium
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
81% confidence
Finding

The chmod step is a secondary privileged operation tied to the broader unsafe direct-install sequence. While not independently severe, it contributes to normalizing root-level execution during installation of externally downloaded software.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw/SKILL.md (reported line 84)May include surrounding context.

curl -L -o /tmp/standx.tar.gz https://github.com/wjllance/standx-cli/releases/download/v0.3.5/standx-v0.3.5-aarch64-apple-darwin.tar.gz tar -xzf /tmp/standx.tar.gz -C /tmp sudo mv /tmp/standx /usr/local/bin/ sudo chmod +x /usr/local/bin/standx

text

## Quick Start

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill recommends adding a JWT and private key to shell startup files such as ~/.bashrc or ~/.zshrc, creating persistent long-lived exposure of sensitive credentials in plaintext on disk. This increases the blast radius from local compromise, backups, dotfile syncing, support bundles, or accidental sharing of shell configuration.

Content

Scanner excerpt · openclaw/SKILL.md (reported line 110)May include surrounding context.

The most secure way to authenticate. Credentials are not stored in shell history or command logs.

bash
# Add to ~/.bashrc or ~/.zshrc
export STANDX_JWT="your_jwt_token"
export STANDX_PRIVATE_KEY="your_ed25519_private_key"