T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
requirements.txt:1- Finding
Unbounded Third-Party Dependency Permits Unreviewed Future Releases
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
requirements.txt:1
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned dependency and software supply-chain exposure
Risk Level: LowComplete Code Snippet:
text requests>=2.28.0Technical Analysis
The dependency specification establishes only a minimum version and permits installation of any future
requestsrelease. Consequently, installations are not reproducible and may consume a release that has not been reviewed or tested by the project.This is not evidence that the current
requestspackage is malicious. Exploitation requires a future allowed release, its distribution channel, or the dependency-resolution environment to become compromised. If that occurs, malicious package code could execute during installation or whenscripts/wise_analyze.pyimportsrequests.This risk is particularly relevant because the application handles medical reports and reads
WISEDIAG_API_KEYfrom the process environment.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises an allowed future
requestsdistribution, its publishing account, or another relevant supply-chain component. - A user runs
pip install -r requirements.txtwithout a lock file or hash verification. - The package resolver selects the compromised release because it satisfies
requests>=2.28.0. - Attacker-controlled code executes during package installation or when
wise_analyze.pyimports the dependency. - That code operates with the installing or invoking user's privileges and may access readable local files, process environment variables, medical-report inputs, and network resources.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could obtain the privileges of the user installing or running the Skill. Within that account's access boundaries, malicious dependency code could read
WISEDIAG_API_KEY, access submitted medical documents and other readable files, alter generated reports, or transmit data over th ...[truncated 201 chars]- An attacker compromises an allowed future
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin
requestsand all transitive dependencies to reviewed versions through a lock file. - Generate and enforce cryptographic hashes, for example with
pip-compile --generate-hashesandpip install --require-hashes. - Install packages only from an explicitly configured trusted package index.
- Use automated dependency monitoring, but require review and testing before updating pinned versions.
- Build and install dependencies in an isolated environment with minimal filesystem access and without exposing
WISEDIAG_API_KEYduring installation. - Maintain a documented process for promptly updating pins when security advisories affect the selected versions.
- Pin
