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Security audit

Wiro AI Image Editing

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The verdict is benign because the scanners found no clear harmful behavior, though they noted a privacy disclosure gap around sending local images to Wiro; the review is partial, so the evidence is incomplete.

Before installing, consider whether you are comfortable sending local images to Wiro when an API key is available. The scanner noted that the workflow does not require a privacy warning before upload. The verdict is benign, but confidence is medium and review coverage is partial, so the evidence is incomplete.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Output HandlingUnvalidated Output Injection, Cross-Context Output, Unbounded Output
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (3)

Local images are uploaded to Wiro without a user-facing privacy warning.

Medium
Category
Output Handling
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The workflow instructs the agent to upload a project file to Wiro whenever an API key is available, but does not require notifying the user that the image will leave their environment. The required pre-run disclosure covers pricing and model settings, not the transfer of potentially private image content to a third-party service.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 37)May include surrounding context.

  • For a file in this project, upload it to Wiro when WIRO_API_KEY is set in the shell, then use the link it returns (list[0].url, files up to 100 MB):

    bash
    curl -fsS -X POST "https://api.wiro.ai/v1/File/Upload" \
      -H "x-api-key: $WIRO_API_KEY" -F "file=@path/to/file"
    

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

text

  When `WIRO_API_SECRET` is set too, the project signs its requests: compute `NONCE=$(date +%s)` and `SIG=$(printf '%s' "$WIRO_API_SECRET$NONCE" | openssl dgst -sha256 -hmac "$WIRO_API_KEY" | awk '{print $NF}')` in the same command and add `-H "x-nonce: $NONCE" -H "x-signature: $SIG"`.
- Never print the key, and never ask the user to paste a key into the chat. Without a key in the shell, ask the user for a public link to the file. A file that was only attached to the chat has no link either: ask for one.

## Run