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Security audit

Zoom Cli

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill supports coherent Zoom workflows and explicitly discloses its optional access to other communications, remote AI services, and meeting changes.

Choose the Zoom profile and permitted accounts or folders explicitly. Remote embeddings can transmit transcript passages beyond the current search filters; use local models or offline mode when appropriate. Require approval for meeting changes through MCP, and restart its server after revoking sources. This review covers the bundled instructions, not the external CLI implementation.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

The skill exposes searches of mail, messages, notes, and Zoom chat/docs beyond its declared meeting and recording scope.

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The manifest limits the skill to archiving recordings, reading stored meeting transcripts and summaries, and managing Zoom meetings. L113-L118 instead advertise standalone searches across messages, mail, and notes, while L187-L188 additionally expose live Zoom chat and document searches; these searches are not restricted to evidence for a selected meeting.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Scope Creep

Low
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill's behavior or capabilities extend beyond its stated purpose. Scope creep allows an agent to perform actions unrelated to its documented functionality, increasing the attack surface.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 124)May include surrounding context.

md
Only use communications IDs explicitly configured for the selected profile through
`zm personal config set context.sources`. A grant covers one whole message/mail account or document folder;
do not broaden scope for an agent. `zm config show` reveals the configured selections. A document
folder uses provider `local` (a plain folder) or `obsidian` (a vault) and account `notes:<folder-id>` from `memo folders list`.

`meetings prepare <series-id> --context-source <id> --context-query '<words>'` adds cited literal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.