Ae1
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md | **其他 AI 工具** | 复制 `SKILL.md` 内容作为系统提示词 | 支持自定义指令 |
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a coherent multi-skill orchestrator, but its permission-bypass mode and local discovery/memory behavior need careful review before installation.
Install only if you are comfortable with a skill that can coordinate other skills, scan local skill registries, and keep brief orchestration history. Before using it, treat bypassPermissions/direct execution as unsafe for anything involving files, deployments, APIs, payments, personal data, or third-party skills, and require explicit confirmation for those actions.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| **其他 AI 工具** | 复制 `SKILL.md` 内容作为系统提示词 | 支持自定义指令 |
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| **其他 AI 工具** | 复制 `SKILL.md` 内容作为系统提示词 | 支持自定义指令 |
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).
高风险操作(遇到任一,必须要求用户确认):
- 删除文件或目录(rm / del / truncate)
- 执行外部命令(git push / npm publish / docker run)
- 发起外部网络请求(发送邮件/短信/支付)
- 修改系统配置(.env / ~/.config / 注册表)
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
The skill explicitly documents a bypassPermissions execution mode that skips approvals entirely, yet presents it as suitable for 'pure analysis tasks' without any guardrails or explicit prohibition on state-changing subtasks. In an orchestrator skill, prompts and subtask routing are dynamic, so normalizing approval bypass increases the chance that file edits, external actions, or other sensitive operations are executed without user confirmation.
The skill explicitly instructs scanning multiple local directories and reading local skill metadata and memory files. Even though it claims minimal reads, this is still filesystem enumeration of user and project paths, which can expose installed capabilities, project structure, and behavioral history that may be sensitive in aggregate.
- SKILL_PATH
config:
- ~/.workbuddy/skills
- .workbuddy/skills
- ~/.claw/skills
- .workbuddy/memory
---
The heading and surrounding operating instructions present the skill as Chinese-first, and the document does not state that output language should follow user preference. This can violate language/locale policy where users must be given a choice rather than having a language imposed implicitly.
The trigger says to automatically activate whenever a task is 'complex' or involves multiple domains, steps, or kinds of expertise, but it does not define clear boundaries beyond a high-level notion of complexity. This ambiguity could cause unintended invocation for many common requests that are merely somewhat involved.
L151 states that when the user explicitly says '直接执行', the orchestrator uses bypassPermissions to '跳过所有确认' ('skip all confirmations'). Later, L276-L309 impose additional gating conditions and a mandatory confirmation checkpoint before execution in bypass mode. This is an active contradiction in the skill's own documentation about whether confirmations are skipped or still required.
The rule that silently skips confirmation when the user says "直接执行" is ambiguous and has no explicit restriction excluding destructive, external, or privacy-impacting actions. In an orchestrator skill, this can be exploited or misapplied to bypass human approval for deployments, API calls, or personal-data handling, undermining the stated human-in-the-loop safety control.
This markdown file presents all operational guidance and examples in Chinese, including headings and descriptive text, with no indication that users may choose another language. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language locale violation unless the constraint is explicitly justified.
The documentation says bypassPermissions will skip all approvals, but provides no mandatory warning, escalation path, or consent requirement before use. In a multi-skill orchestrator, that omission is dangerous because the orchestrator can decompose requests into many subtasks, making it easy for risky operations to occur invisibly under a supposedly convenient execution mode.
The title and surrounding instructional content are written in Chinese with no indication that other languages are supported or that the locale is optional. Under the language/locale policy rule, forcing a specific language without user opt-in is a natural-language policy concern.
The file’s headings, descriptions, UI examples, and persistence examples are all written in Chinese, and there is no indication that users may choose another language or that the skill is intended only for a Chinese-language context. Under the policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in can be a natural-language policy violation.
The document explicitly instructs the orchestrator to persist execution trace details into working memory, including session identifiers, task descriptions, called skills, conflicts, and result summaries, without any notice, consent flow, retention limit, or data minimization guidance. In an orchestration skill, these traces can contain sensitive user requests, intermediate outputs, and cross-skill metadata, creating privacy leakage and unnecessary long-term retention risk.
The trigger rule says Checkpoint-C activates whenever a task involves an external API call, but it does not clarify whether all API calls qualify or only sensitive/data-transmitting ones. This ambiguity can cause inconsistent or unintended invocation behavior because the trigger scope is not clearly bounded.
No suspicious patterns detected.