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Security audit

Remove AI Watermarks

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill’s watermark-removal workflow is clearly disclosed, limited to user-authorized content, and preserves originals by default.

Expect installation or upgrades of a third-party CLI and optional processing dependencies. Keep original files, use only content you are authorized to edit, and review the hosted service’s privacy terms before uploading sensitive media. Removing provenance does not establish that content is human-made.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (2)

Skill declares no tool scope ('permissions' or 'allowed-tools') but code capabilities were detected: file_write, shell.

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

subprocess module call

Medium
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

subprocess module calls execute external commands. Without careful input validation, this enables command injection.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/probe.py (reported line 56)May include surrounding context.

python
def _run(argv: list[str], timeout: float = 8.0) -> tuple[int, str, str]:
    try:
        proc = subprocess.run(  # noqa: S603
            argv,
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.